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ABSTRACT
Improving the Accuracy of Juror Self-Reports of Bias During Rehabilitative Voir Dire
by
Natalie S. Gordon

Advisor: Margaret Bull Kovera, PhD

The courts have long acknowledged pretrial publicity (PTP) as a source of juror bias. To
safeguard defendants due process rights, jurors who harbor bias are frequently asked during voir
dire if they can set aside their bias and be fair and impartial. Yet, jurors’ self-reports of their
ability to be fair and impartial are largely inaccurate. For example, regardless of their level of
exposure to PTP, jurors typically report an ability to be fair and impartial. Therefore, this method
of so-called “juror rehabilitation” is ineffective. This project examines conformity pressures that
may be inhibiting accurate self-reporting during juror rehabilitation and tests the effectiveness of
a novel intervention for increasing the accuracy of jurors’ self-reports. Jurors overwhelmingly
reported an ability be impartial even when they were exposed to PTP but still demonstrated bias
from PTP in their verdict decisions. Efforts to minimize conformity pressures and lessen PTP
bias were ineffective. It is therefore critical that the courts reconsider this practice of juror
rehabilitation and explore more appropriate measures for evaluating juror bias.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that pretrial publicity can foster juror bias
(Estes v. Texas, 1965; Irvin v. Dowd, 1961; Patton v. Yount, 1984; Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991;
Rideau v. Louisiana, 1963; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966; Skilling v U.S., 2010). The Court further
recognizes that prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity violates defendants’ right to trial by a
fair and impartial jury under the 6th and 14th amendments. To safeguard defendants’ due process
rights, prospective jurors are questioned during voir dire by the judge and/or attorneys on caserelevant attitudes and experiences. In many jurisdictions, jurors who express bias are then asked
if they can set aside their bias and render a verdict in a fair and impartial manner. This process is
known as juror rehabilitation (Cosper, 2003; Suggs & Sales, 1981). The courts often take jurors’
professions of fairness at face value (Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991; Patton v. Yount, 1984; Skilling v.
U.S., 2010). Thus, it is assumed that jurors whose exposure to pretrial publicity would bias their
decision-making will self-report an inability to be impartial during voir dire and that jurors who
state they can be impartial will render a verdict unencumbered by bias.
The psycho-legal literature supports the Courts’ contention that pretrial publicity biases
jurors’ decision making (e.g., Steblay et al., 1999). Pretrial publicity increases defendants’
likelihood of conviction in part because jurors misattribute information found in the pretrial
publicity to information presented during trial (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008;
Ruva et al., 2007). However, exposure to pretrial publicity is unrelated to jurors’ self-reports of
impartiality, and jurors’ self-reports of impartiality are unrelated to their final verdicts (Kerr et
al., 1991; Moran & Cutler, 1991; Robertson et al., 2013; Studebaker & Penrod, 2005). This
discrepancy between jurors’ self-reports of impartiality and their ability to be impartial
undermines the courts’ assumption that jurors’ professions of fairness are reliable.
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Features of juror rehabilitation thwart jurors’ ability to accurately self-report. For
example, leading questions and loaded language used by the judge sets the standard for what it
means to be a “good juror” (Hans & Jehle, 2003). As a result, most jurors may say they can be
impartial because it is socially desirable to do so (Broeder, 1964; Diamond et al., 1997). The fact
that the judge conducts the questioning may also compound pressure to respond in a socially
desirable way given that the judge is a legitimate and respected authority figure to whom jurors
may look to as a source of information for how to behave (Hart, 1995). Alternatively, jurors may
look to other jurors as indicia of proper behavior and conform their responses accordingly (Suggs
& Sales, 1980). Jurors may therefore be inaccurately self-reporting an ability to be fair and
impartial due to social desirability demands inherent in voir dire that cause biased jurors to
conform their responses to the expectations of the judge or responses of other jurors.
Jurors may also be inaccurately self-reporting an ability to be fair and impartial because
they are unable to correct for their bias when rendering a verdict. To successfully correct for
judgmental bias, an individual must be aware of the bias, be motivated to correct for it, and have
knowledge of the direction and magnitude of the bias (Wegener & Petty, 1997). Legal remedies
for juror bias resulting from exposure to pretrial publicity—including continuance, deliberation,
limiting instructions, voir dire, and rehabilitation (e.g., Kerr et al., 1991; Lieberman & Arndt,
2000; Steblay et al., 1999; 2006)—may be ineffective because they fail to address each of these
steps. An effective de-biasing intervention should therefore equip jurors with the requisite
awareness, motivation, and knowledge to correct for bias.
Pretrial publicity exerts its biasing effect in part because of source monitoring errors (e.g.,
Ruva et al., 2007), which implicates a potential de-biasing intervention: assist jurors in
distinguishing between information heard from the media and information heard during trial.
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One method of improving jurors’ memory for trial evidence is note-taking (Thorley et al., 2016).
Given that pretrial publicity is most likely to be present in the media in the days immediately
preceding trial (Moran & Cutler, 1991), information regarding pretrial publicity should be
readily available in jurors’ minds during voir dire (among those who have been exposed to that
information). Thus, having jurors write down details of the media coverage to which they have
been exposed may be comparable to asking jurors to write down information heard during trial.
Just as note-taking assists jurors in their recall of trial evidence, having jurors write down what
they learned from pretrial publicity should enhance their memory for that information when it
comes time to render a verdict and, in turn, decrease source monitoring errors. Although it may
increase the accesibility of information obtained through pretrial publicity, it should assist jurors
in distinguishing between information they are legally allowed to consider in rendering a verdict
(i.e., information presented at trial) and information that should be discounted (i.e., pretrial
publicity). Additionally, asking jurors to reflect on information from pretrial publicity to which
they may have been exposed should provide jurors with awareness and motivation to correct for
their bias by allowing them to examine the depth of their knowledge and alerting them to the
significance of pretrial publicity as a potential source of bias. Reflection should enable jurors to
consider exactly what and how much information they have obtained from pretrial publicity, thus
allowing them to calibrate for the direction and magnitude of their bias. Finally, jurors may be
less inclined to look to the behavior of others as heuristic for how to act (Cialdini, 1993) if given
time for reflection. If reflection decreases conformity effects during juror rehabilitation and/or
minimizes jurors’ source monitoring errors, it could serve as an effective and pragmatic
intervention for increasing the accuracy of jurors’ self-reports of their ability to be fair and
impartial.
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The aim of my research is to increase the accuracy of jurors’ self-reports of their ability
to set aside bias from exposure to pretrial publicity and be fair and impartial. Inaccurate selfreports subvert defendants’ constitutional guarantee of due process and can create additional
litigation (e.g., if a defendant proves a biased juror was empaneled, this can result in a mistrial),
which requires more of the legal system’s time and money. Concerns about inaccurate selfreports are exacerbated in high publicity cases as it is from these cases that the public gains
insight into the accuracy and legitimacy of the legal system. The specific research questions I
address are as follows:
1. During juror rehabilitation, how are conformity pressures undermining jurors’ ability
to accurately self-report an ability to be fair and impartial? Are conformity effects due
to pressure from the directives of the judge or the behavior of other jurors?
2. Can a reflection instruction increase biased jurors’ willingness to say they cannot be
fair and impartial (i.e., by decreasing conformity effects)? Can this intervention
decrease source monitoring errors and, in turn, attenuate the impact of pretrial
publicity on jurors’ verdicts?
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Chapter 2: Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity and Legal Remedies
The prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity has been well-established in the psycho-legal
literature and holds across both laboratory and field research (see Studebaker & Penrod, 2005). A
meta-analysis of 23 articles involving a total of 5,755 participants and including 44 effect sizes
found that exposure to negative pretrial publicity increases the likelihood of guilty verdicts,
compared to minimal or no negative pretrial publicity (average r = .16; Steblay et al., 1999).
Pretrial publicity fosters juror bias by decreasing perceptions of the defendant as credible and
increasing source-memory errors for case information (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva &
McEvoy, 2008; Ruva et al., 2007), as well as by arousing jurors’ emotions (Kramer et al., 1990;
Ruva et al., 2011) and causing pre-decisional distortion (Hope et al. , 2004; Ruva et al., 2012)
and prejudgment of guilt (Otto et al.,, 1994; Steblay et al., 1999). The present proposal focuses
on how pretrial publicity imparts its biasing effect to jurors’ decisions through source monitoring
errors.
Source monitoring (SM) errors (Johnson et al., 1992; Lindsay, 1994; Weingardt et al.,
1994) occur when people fail to discriminate among different sources of information, like
pretrial publicity and evidence presented at trial. In one study that examined whether pretrial
publicity influenced jurors’ verdicts through SM errors, students were exposed to negative
pretrial publicity or unrelated news articles, viewed a videotaped criminal trial, rendered a
verdict decision alone or as a group and then completed a source monitoring test (Ruva et al.,
2007). Participants exposed to pretrial publicity were more likely to vote guilty, were more
confident in their verdicts, and gave longer sentences relative to non-exposed participants.
Participants exposed to pretrial publicity (vs. not exposed) were also more likely to misattribute
information contained in the pretrial publicity to either the trial or both the trial and the pretrial
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publicity. These SM errors mediated the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors’ guilt ratings.
Pretrial publicity increases SM errors (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008) and SM
errors mediate the relationship between pretrial publicity and jurors’ guilt judgments (Ruva &
Guenther, 2015).
The courts rely on several remedies to combat the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity.
These remedies include jury instructions, continuance, change of venue, trial evidence,
deliberation, voir dire, and rehabilitation. Each of these methods, with the exception of a change
of venue, is ineffective and, in some cases, can backfire and exacerbate the biasing effect of
pretrial publicity (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Robertson et al., 2013; Steblay et al., 1999; Steblay
et al., 2006; Studebaker & Penrod, 2005). Altough a change of venue may be the most logical
solution because it avoids using jurors who have been exposed to extensive amounts of pretrial
publicity, judges are often reluctant to grant change of venue motions due to the expense and
inconvenience associated with moving a trial or importing jurors (Steblay et al., 1999). Because
it economizes and expedites the trial process (Cosper, 2003), judges typically rely on
rehabilitation—asking jurors if they can set aside bias and be fair and impartial during voir
dire—as a remedy for the potentially deleterious consequences of pretrial publicity (Diamond &
Rose, 2005; Kerr et al., 1991; Robertson et al., 2013; Studebaker & Penrod, 2005).
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Chapter 3: Juror Rehabilitation
The practice of asking jurors if they can set aside bias and base their verdicts solely on
the trial evidence is based on protecting defendants’ constitutional guarantee of trial by a fair and
impartial jury. In other words, the purpose of rehabilitation is to remove jurors who express an
inability to set aside bias and keep only those venirepersons who could be impartial. In the past,
the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism regarding jurors’ professions of fairness after
exposure to pretrial publicity and, in some cases, has granted defendants a new trial (e.g., Estes v.
Texas, 1965; Irvin v. Dowd, 1965; Rideau v. Louisiana, 1963; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966). More
recently, the courts have become comfortable empaneling biased jurors who say they can set
aside their biases and be impartial (e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 1975; Marko v. People, 2018;
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991; Patton v. Yount, 1984; Skilling v. U.S., 2010).
Despite the courts’ assumption that jurors’ self-reports of impartiality can be taken at face
value, there is reason to believe jurors’ reports are inaccurate. In one of the earliest examinations
of jurors’ self-reports of impartiality, nearly 700 potential jurors were interviewed regarding
three high-profile cases in Yolo County, California; no relationship was found between jurors’
case knowledge and self-reported ability to be fair and impartial (Costantini & King, 1980). In a
high publicity case in Southern Illinois, prospective jurors who had been exposed to at least five
newspaper articles were more likely than those exposed to fewer newspaper articles to say there
was a “lot of evidence” against the defendant but were not more likely to self-report an ability to
be fair and impartial or set aside the media coverage (Moran & Cutler, 1991). In 2002, over
1,000 people were surveyed about the then-upcoming John Walker Lindh terrorism trial; 35% of
respondents that had expressed impartiality also expressed a presumption of guilt (Vidmar,
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2003). These field studies indicate that exposure to pretrial publicity does not impact jurors’ selfreports of impartiality, and jurors who profess impartiality still prejudge the defendant as guilty.
Laboratory research also finds that jurors’ self-reports are unreliable (Kerr et al., 1991;
Robertson et al., 2013; Sue et al., 1975). In one of the best examinations of this topic,
participants were presented with factual publicity, emotional publicity, both factual and
emotional publicity, or neither, watched a videotaped mock trial, and then were asked, “Can you
put out of your mind any information you might have received from the newspapers or television
and decide this case solely upon the evidence to be presented in court?” (Kerr et al., 1991, p.
675). As expected, pretrial publicity influenced jury verdicts and post-deliberation individual
verdicts; more importantly, mock jurors who admitted to having bias from exposure to pretrial
publicity but said they could set it aside were just as likely to convict as those who reported no
such biases (Kerr et al., 1991). More recently, mock jurors exposed to pretrial publicity about a
medical malpractice case were just as likely as those not exposed to pretrial publicity to say they
could be impartial, and judgments of liability and damages remained the same when the data
provided by jurors who said they could not be impartial were removed (Robertson et al., 2013).
In sum, jurors’ self-reports of impartiality are unrelated to their pretrial media exposure and
verdicts.
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Chapter 4: Factors Influencing Jurors’ Self-Reports
When jurors are asked if they can set aside case knowledge and be fair and impartial,
they typically respond in the affirmative, with most partiicpants reporting that they could be fair
and impartial [i.e., ranging from 63–89%; Costantini & King, 1980; Kerr et al., 1991; Moran &
Cutler, 1991; Robertson et al., 2013; Sue et al., 1975; Vidmar, 2003). Why are these rates so
high? Perhaps jurors say they can be impartial, regardless of the presence of bias, because of
social desirability concerns. Social desirability concerns arise when people are motivated to be
seen in a positive, socially desirable manner (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). When judges attempt to
rehabilitate jurors, they often use leading questions and loaded language that signal to jurors the
correct, socially desirable response (Hans & Jehle, 2003). For example, after jurors express
doubts about their ability to be impartial because of pretrial publicity exposure, the judge will
explain that the law requires that they ignore the information they have learned from pretrial
publicity and base their verdict exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. When the judge
again asks them if they could be impartial, jurors’ desire to appear favorably may inhibit their
inability to say they can be anything other than impartial lest they be seen as a social deviant
incapable of suppressing their biases (Broeder, 1964; Diamond et al., 1997). Thus, social
desirability pressures cause jurors to say they can be impartial. In saying they can be impartial,
jurors avoid negative consequences for their self-concept.
It is unclear whether it is pressure from the judge, who conducts the questioning, or the
responses of other jurors that make social desirability concerns salient and cause jurors to
conform their behavior (see, e.g., Hart, 1995; Suggs & Sales, 1980). Conformity occurs when
perceived or real pressure from others causes us to act differently from how we would act in their
absence (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Conformity pressures can create a strong sense of internal
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conflict between feeling that one’s peers are wrong and not wanting to feel rejected or disliked
by them. The cost-benefit analysis required in situations of social pressure can therefore require
considerable conscious deliberation. Following others’ behavior saves us time and cognitive
effort because “consensus implies correctness” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 163); thus, consensus
functions as a simple heuristic for how to act (Cialdini, 1993). Not surprisingly, people may find
themselves conforming their behavior reflexively (Epley & Gilovich, 1999).
In an early study of conformity, participants indicated—in the presence of six to eight
other participants who were actually confederates—which one of three lines matched a
comparison line (Asch, 1956). On the first two trials, confederates answered correctly; on the
remaining 16 trials, they responded unanimously and erroneously (although there were four
accurate trials interspersed among the remaining trials to avoid suspicion from the naïve
participants). On each trial, participants heard the responses of the confederates before providing
their own response. Participants could either dissent by providing what was clearly the correct
answer or they could respond incorrectly by conforming to the majority response. Participants
conformed to the majority on 36.8% of trials, and 76% of participants adopted the majority
opinion at least once. In post-experiment interviews, participants explained that they had
conformed because they felt the majority must be right or to avoid feeling different from the
group. Thus, participants conformed their responses to the majority to meet both accuracy and
social goals (Asch, 1956).
Jurors may also be self-reporting an ability to be impartial because they are conforming
their behavior to the directives of the judge. The judge is a legitimate authority figure, and
legitimate authority figures are highly influential people (e.g., Aronson et al., 1963; Blass, 1991;
Milgram, 1974). In another line of research, the majority of participants (65%) delivered
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continuous, intense, and dangerous levels of electric shocks (which they thought were real, but
were not) to an innocent other participant simply because they had been instructed to by a
legitimate authority figure—the experimenter (Milgram, 1974). In one of the experiments, when
the individual directing participants was not in a position of authority, subjects were unwilling to
deliver the electric shocks (Milgram, 1974); additional work supports the finding that people are
less likely to comply with the commands of non-authorities (see Blass, 1991, for a review). In
the courtroom setting, jurors who watched videotaped instructions read by real judges were
influenced by the judge’s expectations about the defendant’s guilt; specifically, jurors tended to
render verdicts comporting with judges’ private beliefs (Hart, 1995).
In sum, jurors may be inaccurately self-reporting impartiality because of pressure from
the judge and/or other jurors that engender conformity towards the socially desirable response.
As mentioned earlier, inaccurate self-reporting also stems from the fact that rehabilitation does
not function as intended—that is, jurors’ verdicts remain biased by exposure to pretrial publicity
despite their professions of an ability to set aside bias and be impartial. Next, I provide a
theoretical explanation for why juror rehabilitation is ineffective and propose a novel de-biasing
intervention.
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Chapter 5: Requirements for De-Biasing Methods
For people to correct for judgmental bias, they must be aware of the bias, have the
motivation to correct for it, and know the direction and magnitude of the bias (also known as the
Flexible Correction Model or FCM; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wegener et al., 1998). Previous
attempts to correct for bias resulting from pretrial publicity may have under or over-corrected for
bias at any number of these steps. Juror rehabilitation, in particular, may fail to correct for bias
because of a failure at step three. In one study that examined juror rehabilitation in the context of
an insanity case, mock jurors participated in either a standard or rehabilitative voir dire, watched
a trial video, and rendered individual verdicts (Crocker & Kovera, 2010). Rehabilitation did not
impact verdicts and biased jurors were more likely to convict the defendant than unbiased jurors,
consistent with previous research. Rehabilitation decreased scaled guilt judgments and negative
attitudes towards the insanity defense relative to standard voir dire for both biased and unbiased
jurors. Thus, rehabilitation caused all jurors to correct for bias, but because rehabilitated mock
jurors displayed less judgmental bias than jurors who received standard voir dire, this indicates
that they over-corrected (Crocker & Kovera, 2010).
In the study just described (Crocker & Kovera, 2010), jurors were presumably both aware
of the presence of bias and motivated to correct for it. The rehabilitative voir dire had been
conducted with the judge one-on-one, which forced jurors to consider whether they personally
harbored any bias against the insanity defense, and the fact that jurors over-corrected shows that
they were motivated. Rehabilitated jurors also had knowledge of the direction of their bias (i.e.,
toward guilt) because they corrected for it by being more lenient, but they did not know how
much this bias would impact their judgments as evidenced by them being more lenient than
jurors who had not been through rehabilitation. Attempts to de-bias jurors, then, must consider
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whether these three prongs (awareness, motivation, and direction plus magnitude) of bias
correction will be adequately fulfilled.
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Chapter 6: Increasing the Accuracy of Jurors’ Self-Reports
When jurors are questioned during voir dire, they are given little time to reflect on the
extent of their bias. Jurors may quickly consider whether they have been exposed to pretrial
publicity in answering the judge’s question about their ability to be fair and impartial, but they
are not provided the opportunity or encouraged to delve into the content of their knowledge.
Thus, this procedure only captures the potential presence but not the magnitude of bias,
precluding accurate responding by jurors who likely are unaware of the extent of their bias.
Further, conformity pressures may be causing jurors to think they are less biased than they
actually are and to feel uncomfortable reporting that their bias would thwart their ability to be
impartial. Rehabilitation may also inhibit accurate reporting because jurors are not given
sufficient time to reflect on the information that they have learned from pretrial publicity prior to
learning new information from trial evidence, which may be contributing to their source
monitoring errors. But will reflection alone be sufficient to improve jurors’ memory of pretrial
publicity and lessen conformity pressures?
Some courts have adopted the practice of allowing jurors to take notes as a means of
enhancing their recall of information presented at trial (Rosenhan et al., 1994; Thorley et al.,
2016). If jurors were provided the opportunity to reflect on and write down information they
have learned about the case through pretrial publicity, this procedure may improve their memory
for that information later on, which could also help them to distinguish the pretrial publicity from
trial evidence. Allowing jurors to review, on paper, the extent of their knowledge from pretrial
publicity may also give jurors a more accurate sense of any bias they may harbor and more
effectively attenuate conformity pressures. Alternatively, reflection may increase self-awareness
and fail to attenuate or even increase conformity effects, and if reflection increases the
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accessibility of information obtained from pretrial publicity, it may backfire and exacerbate the
biasing effects of pretrial publicity.

15

Chapter 7: General Plan of Work
The current practice of asking jurors if they can set aside bias resulting from exposure to
pretrial publicity and be fair and impartial results in inaccurate self-reporting. Conformity
pressures from the judge and other jurors may cause jurors to profess impartiality despite the
presence of bias, and rehabilitation may be ineffective because jurors may not be appropriately
calibrating for judgmental bias (i.e., they may be aware and motivated but not know the extent of
their bias). Having jurors reflect on the information they have learned about the case through
pretrial publicity and write it down may enable jurors to adequately consider the potential
presence of bias and feel less pressure to “go along” with the group response if it is unjustified.
However, if conformity pressures from the judge are also impacting jurors’ self-reports, jurors
may only be truly capable of self-reporting an inability to be impartial if the authority of the
judge is also made less salient.
The act of reflecting on and writing down information should also increase the accuracy
of jurors’ self-reports by making them aware of the presence of any bias they may have,
motivating jurors to correct for it by alerting them to the seriousness of the impact of this bias on
their decision-making, and making jurors aware of the direction and magnitude of their bias by
allowing them to examine the depths of their knowledge. The process of writing down
information obtained from pretrial publicity should increase jurors’ memory for that information
later and assist them in distinguishing between the different sources of information so they can
base their verdict exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the proposed reflection
intervention should increase the accuracy of jurors’ self-reports by attenuating conformity
pressures and decreasing source monitoring errors.
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Chapter 8: Methods
The purpose of my study is, first and foremost, to test for conformity effects as an
explanation for inaccurate self-reports during voir dire. Specifically, I examine whether
conformity toward the socially desirable response is primarily due to pressure from the
expectations of the judge or the behavior of other jurors. The second goal of my study is to test a
novel method of increasing self-reports of bias—namely, having jurors reflect on the pretrial
publicity they have been exposed to and write it down at the outset of voir dire. The goal of this
“reflection” manipulation is to make jurors less likely to conform their behavior to social
pressures and provide more accurate responses during juror rehabilitation, while also providing
them with the tools needed to correct for bias (awareness, motivation, and knowledge of
direction and magnitude) when it comes time to render a verdict by decreasing source monitoring
errors.
Design. My study involves a 2 (Pretrial Publicity: Present, Absent) × 2 (Judge’s
Questions: Closed-Ended, Open-Ended) × 2 (Confederates: Impartial, Mixed) × 3 (Reflection
Instruction: Present, No Writing, None) between-subjects factorial design. The purpose of the No
Writing condition is to test the differential effects of reflecting on the PTP through writing (the
Reflection-Present Condition) and simply thinking about the PTP on jurors’ source monitoring
errors.
Participants. I recruited 484 jury-eligible community members from 35 states through
Craigslist to participate in the study. Although I only needed a sample of 350 participants (power
= .80 to detect a small to moderate effect at p < .05), additional participants were required to
achieve an equal number across conditions (~n = 20). Due to a randomization error, I overrecruited participants in two conditions (with one having 24 participants and another having 21
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participants) and during data cleaning learned that one participant had completed the study twice
so their data was deleted, resulting in one condition having only 19 participants. Mock jurors
were paid $40 for their participation.
I was able to collect data from 60 participants in-person before the study was temporarily
halted due to the university closure resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and forced to
transition online. The protocol remained the same and the remaining 424 participants completed
the study online via Zoom.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 86 (M = 34.8, SD = 12.3). The majority of
participants were female (66.9%) and identified as a Democrat (64.3%). Approximately half of
participants identified as Caucasian (49.6%), and the remaining participants identified as African
American (18.4%), Hispanic/Latino (13.6%), Asian American (12%), Mixed (4.8%), or other
(1.7%). A minority of participants had been the victim of a violent crime (12%) or knew
someone close to them who had been the victim of a violent crime (13%).
Participants primarily came from (in descending order of frequency, n’s above 10): New
York (63.8%), New Jersey (10.8%), Pennsylvania (5.4%), California (3.9%), Massachusetts
(3.3%), and Connecticut (2.1%). Within New York, participants primarily came from Manhattan
County (37%), Kings County (23.7%), Queens County (20.1%), and the Bronx County (9.4%).
For highest level of education, 5.8% had a high school education, 12.4% had some college
education, 6.2% had an Associate’s degree, 0.8% had attended technical/vocational school,
53.1% had a Bachelor’s degree, 19.4% had a Master’s degree, and 2.3% had attended graduate
school (e.g., JD, MD, PhD, Post Doc, etc.). A minority of participants knew someone in law
enforcement (13.6%) and had previously served on a jury (7.6%).
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Materials. Pretrial publicity manipulation. Participants in both PTP conditions received
nine news stories (10 pages of text) that have been used in prior research on PTP (Ruva &
Guenther, 2015; Ruva et al., 2007; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008). Participants in the PTP-present
condition read actual PTP surrounding the New Jersey v. Daniel Bias (1992) trial, which
included both general information about the case as well as information that could bias jurors’
judgments. Participants in the PTP-absent condition read actual news articles about an unrelated
crime involving embezzlement of child support funds. Case dates in the news articles were
modified to be more recent: in the PTP Present articles, the case date was originally 1989 and
was changed to 2015; in the PTP absent articles, the case date was 1983 and was changed to
2016. Daniel Bias’ surname was changed to Miller.
Recall test. Participants completed a 9-question recall test to gauge whether they had
adequately read the news stories (approximately one question for each article). For the PTPpresent conditions, the questions were as follows: 1) In what city did this occur? 2) Did Daniel
Miller make bail? 3) Will the prosecution seek the death penalty? 4) Why did Daniel Miller
move to New Mexico after Lisa’s death? 5) How has Daniel Miller behaved since Lisa’s death?
6) Did Daniel Miller ever go to therapy? If yes, provide as much information as you can
remember. 7) How often did Lisa visit her family? 8) Why does the defense want someone to
testify on Daniel Miller’s behalf? 9) Who does the prosecution hope will testify a trial to refute
the claim that Lisa was suicidal? For the PTP-absent conditions, the questions will be as follows:
1) What was Ann, the women who came into the county domestic relations office, upset about?
2) How often were the cash register tapes checked? 3) How is the domestic relations office going
to prevent something like this from happening again? (hint: think about the computer program,
checking account, who is checking payments, etc.). 4) When are support checks now given to
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mothers? 5) What type of investigative actions are taking place within the domestic relations
office as a result of this theft? 6) What was one of the conclusions of the audit report? 7) Is there
any proof that other employees took money? 8) What did the district attorney conclude about the
domestic relations office’s role in all of this? 9) Did Goldshalk lie to police in the preliminary
investigation? Participants who got fewer than 7 out of 9 questions correct were ineligible to
participate.
Judge’s questioning. Across conditions, the judge began with the following instruction:
“Hello everyone. I am going to question each of you about your ability to serve as mock jurors in
a murder case. The murder case is about a man, Daniel Miller, who has been accused of
murdering his wife, Lisa Miller. I am going to begin by asking each of you some information
about yourselves.” The judge then asked jurors standard voir dire questions: county of residence,
highest level of eduction, employment, knowledge of anyone in law enforcment, and previous
jury service. Then, the judge instructed jurors on the law regarding PTP as follows: “The case we
have before us today has received a lot of media attention. It is possible that the media has
released information about this case, none of which you should consider if you are asked to
render a verdict about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of this crime.” The judge read
the reflection instructions (provided in more detail below) and then stated, “I’d now like to ask
you to tell me what you may know about the case. But, so as not to expose the other jurors to any
information you may have heard, I would like to ask the other jurors to step out of the room [in
person sessions]/I am going to send the other jurors into the waiting room [online sessions] while
you provide me with that information.” The judge then allowed time for other jurors to leave the
room. Next, in the closed-ended condition, the judge attempted to rehabilitate confederate #1
using a question format meant to elicit a yes/no response: “Regardless of what you may know
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about the case, do you think you will be able to set aside everything you have heard about the
case and only base your decision on the evidence presented in this courtroom as the law
requires?” In the open-ended condition, this question was modified to elicit a broader range of
responses: “Please explain your beliefs about your ability to set aside any knowledge you might
have about the case and be fair and impartial as the law requires." The closed-ended condition is
intended to simulate how judges typically conduct rehabilitation and mimic typical conformity
pressures exerted by the judge, whereas the open-ended condition is intended to lessen
conformity pressures exerted by the judge based on previous research finding open-ended
questions elicit more accurate responses relative to closed-ended questions in previous research
(Middendorf & Luginbuhl, 1995). The judge repeated this process for confederate #2 and then
finally the naïve participant.
Instructions for the confederates. Two confederate-participants were instructed to
respond to the judges’ questioning and either both of them say they can be impartial (impartial
condition) or one say they can be impartial and the other say they cannot be impartial (mixed
condition). For in-person sessions, confederates were situated so that they always responded to
the judges’ questioning before the naïve participant, thus allowing their responses to exert any
potential conformity pressures on the naïve participant. In addition, for both in person and online
sessions, confederates were always referred to as “juror 1” and “juror 2” so that the naïve
participant would be “juror 3” and always questioned last without suspicious. The confederates’
responses in the closed-ended and open-ended conditions were virtually identical. In the closedended and impartial condition, confederates said “Yes” and in the open-ended and impartial
condition, confederates said “I believe I’d be able to be fair and impartial.” In the closed-ended
and partial condition, confederates will say “No” and in the open-ended and partial condition,
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confederates will say “I don’t believe I could be fair and impartial.” The purpose of having both
an impartial and mixed condition is to examine whether and how much conformity pressures are
due to other jurors.
Trial stimulus. The trial stimulus consisted of a refilmed and professionally made,
videotaped reenactment of 34 minutes of video from NJ v. Bias, in which a man was charged
with murdering his wife. The video contained opening and closing statements, direct and crossexamination of witnesses, and judicial instructions. Previous research has found this trial to be
ambiguous as to the defendant’s guilt and realistic (Hope et al., 2004; Pritchard & Keenan, 1999,
2002). The surname of the defendant, Daniel Bias, and the victim, Lise Bias, was changed from
"Bias" to "Miller."
Reflection Instructions. Across conditions, the judge began with an instruction to
disregard pretrial publicity (described above). In the reflection conditions, the judge instructed
jurors on the following:

It is up to you to determine your suitability to serve as a juror on this case. The court
cannot make that decision for you. I understand that it may be difficult to evaluate your
suitability to serve, so I would like to try to help you by going through a brief exercise.
We are asking you to do this exercise because of how important it is that you accurately
report on your ability to serve. Information learned outside the courtroom cannot be
verified. Although that information may be compelling and seem relevant to the trial, it
may have caused you to form some opinions about the defendant, either positively or
negatively. Therefore, to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, you should ask
yourself whether information you have learned about the case outside of this courtroom
would make it difficult for you to be impartial.
I would like to begin by asking each of you to think about any information you may have
learned about this case from the media – that is, news articles, social media, magazines,
and so forth. [In person sessions only: After you have spent a couple of minutes thinking
about what you may have learned about the case, I would like you to write down as much
information as you can remember about this case on the sheets of paper in front of you.]
[Online participants only: After you have spent a couple of minutes thinking about what
you may have learned about the case, I would like you to type up and send me a direct
message in the chat feature with as much information as you can remember about this

22

case.] Please be as detailed as possible. Once you have finished, I would like you to
spend a couple of minutes thinking about whether any knowledge you have of this case
might make it difficult for you to follow the law. In other words, I would like you to
reflect on whether you believe you would have difficulty setting aside any information
you have learned about the case from the media and focus exclusively on the evidence
presented during trial in reaching a verdict.
In the reflection-without writing condition, the instruction to participants to write or type up what
they could remember was not included; everything else was the same.
Source monitoring test. Participants completed a SM test in which they indicated whether
a particular statement appeared in the trial, news stories, both trial and news stories, or neither of
those sources. The SM test (adopted from Ruva & McEvoy, 2008 and Ruva et al., 2007)
contained a total of 48 items: 17 trial facts, 14 PTP facts, 6 unrelated news facts, and 11 news
facts. Examples include “Just prior to her death, Lisa told her husband that she was no longer
going to have his baby” (trial fact) and “On the day of her death Daniel and Lise had an
argument about Lisa taking a promotion at work” (PTP fact).
Juror questionnaire. The juror questionnaire asked jurors to provide a verdict (Not Guilty
or Guilty), rate how likely it is that the defendant, Daniel Miller, is responsible for the death of
Lisa Miller (on a 7-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Not at all Likely, 7 = Extremly Likely), and how
blameworthy Daniel Miller is for the death of Lisa Miller (on a 7-point Likert-type scale, 1 = Not
at all Blameworthy, 7 = Extremely Blameworthy). On 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree), participants rated (a) how confident they are in their ability to set
aside any bias they may have had, (b) how motivated they are to set aside bias, (c) how
comfortable they felt expressing any bias to the judge, (d) the extent to which the judge had
influenced their responses about their ability to be fair and impartial, (e) how much their
response had been influenced by fellow jurors, and (f) how confident they are in their ability to
be fair and impartial. They were also asked how much they believe any biases they may have
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would have influenced their decision-making on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not applicable
because I have no bias, 5 = It would have biased my decision completely). They were then asked
basic demographic questions (i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, political orientation, income level, and
having been or knowing someone close to them who has been the victim of violent crime).
Recording equipment. Participants’ responses during voir dire were video and audio
recorded for later transcription, coding, and analysis. It was expected that participants’ responses
in the open-ended condition would be broader than the simple yes/no responses in the closedended condition and thus require a content analysis. Had there been more variability in jurors’
responses to the rehabilitation question (to be elaborated on more in the results), the content
analysis would have focused on how jurors’ responses in the open-ended conditions differed
based on whether they have been exposed to PTP and the responses of other jurors (i.e., whether
other jurors are reporting an ability to be fair and impartial or not). Are jurors just as likely to
report an ability to be fair and impartial regardless of PTP exposure and the responses of other
jurors, indicating conformity pressures being exerted predominantly by the judge? Or are jurors
exposed to PTP (vs. not) more likely to report an inability to be fair and impartial if other jurors
are also reporting an inability to be fair and impartial, indicating conformity pressures stemming
from the behavior of other jurors?
Procedure. Participants were recruited for the study online through advertisements
placed on Craigslist. The advertisements described an opportunity to participate in a research
study on decision-making and would require reading some news articles beforehand. Participants
were allowed to sign up for a study session up to the day prior to any given session. Once
participants signed up for a session, they were randomly assigned to the PTP-present or PTPabsent conditions and received an e-mail containing a link to the nine news articles. They were
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also informed that they must have read all of the articles and completed a brief questionnaire
about the articles prior to their session to be eligible to participate. Participants read the PTP
information online to record their time spent on each article and ensure that they were receiving
the intended PTP manipulation. Participants who get fewer than 7 out of 9 questions correct were
informed that they were ineligible to participate.1 For in-person sessions, upon arrival to the
study, participants were taken into a mock courtroom in groups of three. For online sessions,
which were conducted over Zoom, participants entered a virtual “waiting room” and then, once
the other confederates had logged on, were all allowed to enter the main room. In each group,
two of the participants were confederates. Participants began by providing their informed
consent and then a professional actor playing the role of the judge entered the courtroom or the
main room over Zoom. The judge, who was blind to whether the participant had read the PTP,
instructed participants that they were going to be questioned regarding their suitability to serve as
mock jurors on a murder case. The judge briefly described the case and then publicly asked the
standard voir dire questions of each juror. Next, the judge instructed jurors on the law regarding
PTP and then asked jurors privately (i.e., by having the confederates step out of the mock
courtroom or sending them to the virtual waiting room) what they may know about the case.
Then, the judge read jurors the reflection instructions (with or without writing, depending on the
condition) and then read the closed or open-ended rehabilitation question publicly; first, to each
of the confederates (Jurors 1 and 2) and then to the naïve participant (Juror 3). The judge then
instructed jurors that they have all been empaneled on the jury, reminded them that it is their
duty to set aside any biases and render a verdict based only on the evidence, and that they would

1

Seventy-four participants were deemed ineligible to participate because they did not pass the
recall test.
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be brought into separate rooms (or, for online sessions, “breakout rooms”) to watch the trial
video and render verdicts (thus allowing for the confederates to leave the study). The naïve
participant was then brought into a physical room or virtual breakout room where they watched
the videotaped trial and completed the juror questionnaire and SM test. Finally, the experimenter
debriefed participants.
Hypotheses
H1. I predicted a four-way interaction of PTP, judge’s questioning, confederates’
responses, and reflection instructions on participants’ responses to the rehabilitation question. (a)
In the no reflection conditions, there will be a three-way interaction of PTP, judge’s questioning,
and confederates’ responses. When the judge uses a closed-ended question format, there will be a
two-way interaction of confederate’s responses and PTP exposure. Specifically, when
confederates say they can be impartial, I expected that participants will be equally likely to report
that they are able to be fair and impartial, irrespective of their PTP exposure. In contrast, when
confederates provide mixed responses of their ability to be impartial, I expected that participants
will be less likely to report an ability to be fair and impartial when they have been exposed to
PTP than when they have not. (b) When the judge uses an open-ended question format, there will
be a two-way interaction of PTP and confederates’ responses. Specifically, when confederates
say they can be impartial, participants will be less likely to report an ability to be impartial when
they have been exposed to PTP than when they have not. Participants will be less likely to report
an ability to be impartial when they have been exposed to PTP than when they have not, but the
simple main effect of PTP will be larger when confederates provide mixed reports of their ability
to be impartial than when confederates report that they can be impartial. (c) In
the reflection conditions, there will be a two-way interaction of PTP and confederates’ responses.
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Specifically, participants will be less likely to report an ability to be impartial when they have
been exposed to PTP than when they have not; however, the simple main effect of PTP will be
larger when confederates provide mixed reports of their ability to be impartial than when
confederates report that they can be impartial. There will be no effect of judge’s questioning
style. (d) The reflection-no writing conditions are expected to show the same pattern of results as
the reflection conditions, but the effects will be greater in the reflection conditions relative to in
the reflection-no writing conditions.
H2. I predicted a two-way interaction of PTP exposure and reflection instruction on
participants’ source monitoring errors. (a) I predicted that when reflection is absent, participants
will make more source monitoring errors when they have been exposed to PTP than when they
have not. (b) When reflection (either with or without writing) is present, the effect of PTP
exposure on source monitoring errors will be diminished and potentially nonexistent in the
reflection with writing condition. (c) The conformity manipulation was not expected to influence
source monitoring errors.
H3. I predicted a two-way interaction of PTP exposure and reflection instruction on
participants’ verdicts. Specifically, I predicted (a) that when reflection is absent, participants will
be more likely to convict when they have been exposed to PTP than when they have not. (b) When
reflection (either with or without writing) is present, the effect of PTP exposure on verdicts will
be diminished and potentially nonexistent in the reflection with writing condition. (c) The
conformity manipulation was not expected to influence verdicts.
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Chapter 9: Results
Data Analytic Strategy
According to my pre-registered data analytic plan2, I intended to analyze jurors’
responses to the fair and impartial question (H1) using logistic regression. However, due to the
extreme lack of variance in jurors’ responses to that question, the data are instead presented
descriptively. I had also stated that I would analyze jurors’ source monitoring errors (H2) using a
two-way between-subjects ANOVA based on the fact that Ruva and colleagues (Ruva &
Guenther, 2015; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008; Ruva et al. 2007) had analyzed their SM data using that
method. After further consideration, I determined that a multiple regression analysis would be
more appropriate, although it is worth noting that ANOVA and regression rely on the same
analytic model, but the inference procedure is different because the information is presented in
different ways. For example, I am hypothesizing a 2X3 interaction of PTP exposure and
reflection instruction, where reflection instruction is a three-level IV and would therefore render
the intercept in a regression more meaningful than in an ANOVA. Specifically, regression can
dummy codes factors so that the intercept becomes the mean of the reference group—which, in
this case, I want to be the PTP absent, no reflection/control group—and compares that group
with all other groups. Alternatively, an ANOVA tells me if there is a difference between any of
the groups, which would be virtually indistinguishable from a regression in a simple 2X2 design.
Multiple regression will indicate where there is a difference for reflection instruction, if there is
one (i.e., by dummy coding reflection instruction, I can compare the PTP absent, no
reflection/control group with the PTP absent, reflection group and the PTP absent, no
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Gordon, N. S., & Kovera, M. B. (2021, January 25). Improving the Accuracy of Juror SelfReports of Bias During Rehabilitative Voir Dire. Retrieved from osf.io/v79c5
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reflection/control with the PTP absent, reflection-no writing group), whereas an ANOVA would
simply tell me whether there is a difference between groups somewhere within the levels of
reflection instruction. I would need to run post hoc tests for the ANOVA to identify where, if at
all, there is a difference for my three-level IV—not to mention post hoc tests examine all
possible comparisons, which is less parsimonious—thus making a regression not only more
appropriate based on my hypotheses but also more efficient. Jurors’ verdicts (H3) were analyzed
as planned using binary logistic regression.
I also conducted several exploratory analyses. First, I coded jurors’ verbal and—for the
reflection conditions—written responses during voir dire about their case knowledge; created a
score for PTP items mentioned verbally and in written form; examined differences in what was
stated verbally and in written form; and evaluated the relationship between their verbal and
written scores, on the one hand, and critical SM errors, correct trial judgments, and verdicts, on
the other. Second, I conducted a logistic regression to assess the mediating role of critical SM
errors in the relationship between PTP exposure and dichotomous juror verdicts. Third, I
conducted a principal components analysis for nine of the ten items from the juror questionnaire
(i.e., all items except the verdict question) to assess relationships between items and whether
they predicted any common components. Components identified as reliable were subsequently
subjected to multiple regression analyses with all four manipulated independent variables as
predictors. Finally, I conducted a logistic regression with demographic variables as predictors of
verdicts.
I provide results in the order of my hypotheses, beginning with H1, and then move on to
exploratory analyses.
Jurors’ Ability to be Fair and Impartial
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Jurors’ responses to judge’s rehabilitation question were recoded into a dichotomous
“yes/no” response for analysis. There were two coders and they reached 100% agreement on
coding of jurors’ responses to this question. In response to the judge’s rehabilitation question,
474 participants (97.9%) said they could be fair and impartial. This demonstrates the
overwhelming pressure to respond in the affirmative to this question, on which I expand in the
discussion section.
Among the 10 participants who said they could not be fair and impartial, three came from
condition 3 (PTP present, reflection, closed, mixed), one came from condition 5 (PTP present,
reflection, open, impartial), one came from condition 7 (PTP present, reflection, open, mixed),
two came from condition 11 (PTP present, reflection-no writing, closed, mixed), two came from
condition 15 (PTP present, reflection-no writing, open, mixed), and one came from condition 19
(PTP present, no reflection, closed, mixed). All of these are PTP present conditions. All but one
of these are reflection conditions (with or without writing). All but one of these are conditions
where the confederate gave a “mixed” (vs. impartial) response. About half (n = 6) and half (n =
4) came from conditions where the judge asked the rehabilitation question using a closed or
open-ended format, respectively. Although these numbers are too small to conduct statistical
analyses, there is a general trend in the direction we expected for hypothesis (a), with
participants in the reflection conditions, mixed conditions, and those exposed to PTP being less
likely to say they could be fair and impartial; the judge’s questioning style did not seem to
matter.
There is evidence, however, that manipulating the judge’s questioning style worked, even
though it did not influence jurors’ dichotomous decisions about impartiality. Jurors in the closed
conditions said less (M = 1.23, SD = 1.41) than jurors in the open conditions (M = 13.0, SD =
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13.2), t(482) = -13.8, p < .001, d = -1.25. Thus, as expected based on research on disclosure
(Middendorf & Lugeinbuhl, 1995), jurors asked the rehabilitation question in an open format
provided more information regarding their beliefs about their ability to be fair and impartial than
those asked the rehabilitation question in a closed format.
Predictors of Source Monitoring Judgments
The uncorrected mean proportions of SM responses are shown in Table 1, separated into
two panels as a function of PTP condition (i.e., present vs. absent). The first panel displays the
mean proportions for each SM response (trial, PTP, both or new) for the trial items. These
proportions were calculated by summing the number of trial items attributed to each response
category and then dividing this sum by the total number of trial items, with the mean response
being reported in Table 1. In line with Ruva and colleagues’ (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva &
McEvoy, 2008; Ruva et al.; 2007) research on SM, mean proportions were corrected for
guessing before being subject to analysis. This process is explained in more detail below.

Table 1
Mean Proportions of SM Errors as a Function of PTP Exposure.

Response
PTP Present
Trial
PTP
Both
New
PTP Absent
Trial
PTP
Both
New

Trial

Actual Source
PTP

New

.67
.04
.10
.19

.05
.48
.09
.30

.01
.04
.004
.92

.76
.01
.02
.21

.08
.07
.01
.82

.01
.01
.001
.97
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I am interested in two types of SM judgments: critical SM errors (CSME’s), defined as
PTP errors in which participants misattributed information contained only in the PTP as
appearing in the trial or in both the trial and the PTP, and correct judgments of trial items,
defined as trial items correctly identified as coming from the trial. The proportion of CSME’s
made by each participant was calculated as an error score, which was corrected for guessing by
subtracting from it the proportion of new items identified as being either in the trial or in both the
trial and the PTP. This same procedure was done for trial correct scores, which was corrected for
guessing by taking the proportion of correct trial judgments and subtracting from it the
proportion of new items attributed to the trial (see Table 2).

Table 2
Corrected Mean Proportions of SM Errors as a Function of PTP Exposure.
Type of Response
Condition

PTP Error

Trial Correct

PTP Present

.12 (.12)

.62 (.16)

PTP Absent

.07 (.10)

.70 (.14)

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses following their respective means. Critical
source errors include items that were incorrectly attributed to the trial or to both the trial and
PTP.
I subjected CSME’s to a multiple regression with PTP exposure and reflection instruction
as predictors. For PTP exposure, PTP absent was the reference group, and for reflection
instructions, the control condition was the reference group. These two predictors were entered in
the first step and the interaction between the two was entered in the second step. The main
effects were entered separate from the interaction because when an interaction is added to a
regression model, the main effects become conditional on the other predictors (i.e., the main
effect for each factor is the effect of that factor when the other factor is zero); whereas, in a main
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effects-only model, a main effect can be interpreted as the independent effect of that factor
collapsed across the other factor’s conditions. Therefore, given that I am hypothesizing both
main effects and an interaction, it is useful to run the analysis in two steps to determine if the
compounding effect of these predictors (i.e., the interaction) has something to explain over and
above the main effects on their own. I used this two-step process for all subsequent regression
analyses.
Step 1 yielded an R2 = .05, F(3, 480) = 7.91, p < .001. In support of H2, PTP was a
statistically significant predictor of SM errors: Jurors exposed to PTP made significantly more
CSME’s (M = .12, SD = .12) than did non-exposed jurors (M = .07, SD = .10), p < .001),
indicating that jurors exposed to PTP were significantly more likely than their non-exposed
counterparts to attribute information presented only in the PTP to either the trial or both the trial
and the PTP. The reflection instruction was not a statistically significant predictor of CSME’s, p
= .37. Finally, the addition of the interaction at Step 2 did not statistically significantly improve
the model fit, Δ R2 = .01 (see Table 3).
Multiple regression was also used to examine the effects of PTP exposure and reflection
instruction on correct SM judgments for trial items. As in the previous analysis with CSME’s as
the outcome variable, the PTP absent and no reflection/control conditions were included as the
reference categories and main effects were entered into the first step, followed by the interaction
term. Step 1 yielded an R2 = .08, F(3, 480) = 12.88, p < .001. In support of H2, jurors not
exposed to PTP made significantly more correct trial judgments (M = .70, SD = .14) than did
jurors exposed to PTP (M = .62, SD = .16), p < .001. Additionally, jurors asked to reflect only
made significantly more correct trial judgments (M = .68, SD = .13) than did those not asked to
reflect (M = .65, SD = .17), p = .03. That is, jurors not exposed to PTP correctly identified more

33

items as coming from the trial compared to jurors exposed to PTP, and jurors who were asked to
reflect on what they know about the case but who were not also asked to write about what they
know correctly identified more items as coming from the trial than did those not asked to reflect.
Finally, the addition of the interaction at Step 2 did not statistically significantly improve the
model fit, ΔR2 = .01(see Table 4).

Table 3
Critical SM Errors as a Function of PTP Exposure and Reflection Instructions.

Variables in the equation
Step 1
PTP Present
Reflection
Reflection-No Writing

b
.42
-.01
.13

95% CI for
b
Lower Upper
.24
-.23
-.09

.59
.20
.34

t

p

4.68 .00
-0.13 .90
1.15 .25

sr2
.04
.00
.00

95% CI for
sr2
Lower Upper
.01
-.00
-.01

.08
.00
.01

Step 2
2.14 .03 .01
.33
PTP Present
.03
.63
-.01
.03
0.29 .77 .00
.04
Reflection
-.26
.35
-.00
.00
-0.40 .69 .00
-.06
Reflection-No Writing
-.37
.24
-.00
.00
-0.52 .60 .00
-.11
PTP Present x Reflection
-.54
.31
-.00
.00
PTP Present x ReflectionNo Writing
.37
-.05
.80
1.72 .09 .01
-.01
.02
2
Note. b represents standardized regression weights. sr represents the semi-partial correlation
squared. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant.
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Table 4
Correct Trial Judgments as a Function of PTP Exposure and Reflection Instructions.

Variables in the equation
Step 1
PTP Present
Reflection
Reflection-No Writing

b
-.50
.03
.23

95% CI for
b
Lower Upper
-.67
-.19
.02

-.33
.24
.45

t

p

sr2

-5.72
0.23
2.18

.00
.82
.03

.06
.00
.01

95% CI for
sr2
Lower Upper
.02
-.00
-.01

.10
.00
.03

Step 2
-3.54 .00 .02
-.54
PTP Present
-.84
-.24
-.00
.05
-0.83 .41 .00
-.13
Reflection
-.43
.17
-.00
.01
2.18 .03 .01
.33
Reflection-No Writing
.03
.63
-.01
.03
1.39 .16 .00
.30
PTP Present x Reflection
-.12
.72
-.01
.01
PTP Present x ReflectionNo Writing
-.20
-.62
.23
-0.91 .37 .00
-.01
.01
Note. b represents standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation
squared. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant.
Predictors of Verdicts
Overall, 55.6% (n = 269) of participants voted to convict the defendant. I conducted a
hierarchical logistic regression to determine whether PTP exposure and reflection instructions, as
well as the interaction between the two, predicted participants’ verdicts. In the first step, I
entered the two predictors: PTP exposure (with PTP absent as the reference group) and the
reflection instructions (with the control as the reference group). In the second step, I entered their
interaction. In the first step, the omnibus test was significant, χ2(3, N = 484) = 10.7, p = .01,
Nagelkerke R2 = .03. In support of H3, there was a significant main effect of PTP exposure on
verdicts (c), χ2(1, N = 484) = 8.51, p = .00, OR = 1.71, 95% CI [1.19, 2.46]. The ratio of guilty
verdicts to not guilty verdicts was 1.71 times higher in the PTP present conditions than in the
PTP absent conditions. In the PTP present condition, 62% voted guilty, whereas only 49% voted
guilty in the PTP absent condition. Compared to the control group, the reflection conditions were
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not significant predictors of participants’ verdicts, χ2(2, N = 484) = 2.32, p = .31. In the second
step, adding the interaction term did not significantly improve the fit of the model [χ2(2, N =
484) = .87, p = .65] and the interactions were not significant (see Table 5).

Table 5
Effects of PTP Exposure and Reflection Instructions on Guilty Verdicts.

Variables in the equation
Step 1
PTP Present
Reflection
Reflection-No Writing

B

SE

Z

p

OR

.54
-.34
-.13

.19
.23
.23

2.90
-1.50
-0.56

.00
.13
.58

1.71
0.71
0.88

95% CI for OR
Lower Upper
1.19
0.46
0.56

2.46
1.11
1.38

Step 2
PTP Present x Reflection
.29
.45
0.63
.53
1.33
0.55
3.23
PTP Present x Reflection-No
Writing
.42
.46
0.91
.36
1.52
0.62
3.72
Note. Estimates represent the log odds of Guilty vs. Not Guilty. CI = confidence interval; OR
= odds ratio. Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; PTP present = 1; reflection = 1;
reflection/no writing = 1. Z statistics calculated using the Wald method.
Exploratory Analyses
Case Knowledge
Jurors’ verbal responses to the judge’s question regarding what they know about the case
were coded for mention of any of the 14 PTP items from the source monitoring test (0 = PTP
item not mentioned, 1 = PTP item mentioned). Values were totaled to create a PTP total score.
This coding was also done on jurors’ written recollections of what they know about the case (i.e.,
only for those 164 jurors in the reflection conditions). Coders met to resolve any discrepancies
and I achieved moderate to high inter-rater agreement for verbal responses (κ = .80 - .93) and
moderate agreement for written responses (κ = .74). I also calculated the number of words
spoken and written for analysis.
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Not surprisingly, for jurors in the reflection conditions, the more PTP items they
mentioned verbally, the more PTP items they wrote, r(164) = 0.63, p < .001. Overall, reflection
jurors mentioned more PTP items verbally (M = 1.19, SD = 1.70) than in writing (M = .54, SD =
.88) [t(163) = -6.23, p < .001, d = -.49] and, across conditions, verbal responses (M = 153.38, SD
= 215.53) were lengthier than written responses (M = 62.47, SD = 58.64), t(483) = -6.21, p <
.001, d = -.55. Mentioning PTP items verbally or in written form was not related to CSME’s or
correct trial judgments (see Table 6). There was also no difference between jurors who voted
guilty or not guilty and the number of PTP items mentioned verbally or in written form, p = .42
and p = .34, respectively.

Table 6
Correlations Between PTP Items Mentioned and Source Monitoring Judgments.
PTP Items Mentioned
SM Judgments
Verbally
Written
Critical SM Errors
.03
-.00
Trial Correct
-.07
-.02
Note. n = 484 for verbal PTP items mentioned; n = 164 for written PTP items mentioned.
Critical Source Monitoring Errors
A logistic regression model was tested to investigate whether, as previous research has
indicated (e.g., Ruva & Guenther, 2015), the association between PTP and verdicts is mediated
by SM errors. PTP was significantly related to CSME’s [b = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, 95% CI =
.03, .07] and independently associated with verdicts [b = -.31, SE = .12, OR = 1.36, p < .001,
95% CI = -.55, -.09]. CSME’s, however, were not independently associated with verdicts [b = .56, SE = .53, p = .29, OR = 1.75, 95% CI = -1.56, .52]. The bootstrap confidence intervals
derived from 1,000 samples indicated that the indirect effect coefficient was not significant (b = -
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.03, SE = .03, p = .32, OR = 1.03, 95% CI = -.08, .02), which did not support the hypothesis that
the relation between PTP and verdicts is mediated by CSME’s (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
Mediation Model of PTP Exposure on Verdicts through Critical SM Errors.

Critical SM Errors

-.56 (.53)

.05 (.01)***

PTP

c’ = -.33 (.11)**
c = -.31 (.12)**

Verdicts

Note. Mediational model predicting verdicts from PTP and CSME’s. Values show
unstandardized path coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Positive and negative path
coefficients indicate a positive or negative relationship between variables, respectively.
C indicates total effect. C’ indicates direct effect. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Juror Questionnaire
I conducted a principal components analysis (PCA) with varimax (orthogonal) rotation of
the nine items from the juror questionnaire (i.e., all items but the verdict question). The juror
questionnaire generally assessed jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility and
blameworthiness, confidence and motivation to set aside bias, and influence from the
judge/fellow jurors over their response regarding their ability to be impartial. Item 10 was
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reverse coded so that higher scores indicated a greater belief that they would not be biased in
rendering a verdict. Item 10 is on a 5-point scale, whereas the other eight items are all on 7-point
scales, so I transformed responses into standardized (z) scores before entered them into the PCA.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of .69 indicated mediocre sampling adequacy (Kaiser,
1974), and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2 (36) = 1803, p < .001. The PCA
yielded three components with eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1. Five items had factor
loadings of .50 or above on the first component; two items had factor loadings of .96 or above on
the second component; and two items had factor loadings above .85 on the third component. The
first component tapped into jurors’ confidence and motivation to set aside bias and appeared to
have good internal consistency,  = .80 (lowest  if item deleted is .70). The second component
measured jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility and blameworthiness and had
excellent internal consistency,  = .93, (lowest  if item deleted is .87). The third component,
which measured the extent to which jurors felt their responses about their ability to be impartial
had been influenced by the judge and fellow jurors, did not have adequate internal consistency
( = .65). Items from components one and two were averaged to create measures where higher
scores indicated greater confidence/motivation to set aside bias and greater belief in the
defendant’s responsibility/blameworthiness, respectively. These two measures were then used in
subsequent analyses.
I subjected mean scores for jurors’ confidence/motivation to set aside bias to a multiple
regression that included all of my manipulations as predictors: PTP exposure, reflection
instruction, judge’s questioning, and confederate’s responses. For PTP exposure, PTP absent was
the reference group; for reflection instructions, the control condition was the reference group; for
judge’s questioning, closed was the reference group; and for confederate’s responses, impartial
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was the reference group. These four predictors were entered in the first step and all possible 2 ×
2 interactions (nine total) were entered in the second step. Step 1 yielded an R2 = .01, F(5, 478) =
1.08, p = .37. None of the main effects were significant. Including the interactions at Step 2 did
not statistically significantly improve the model fit, Δ R2 = .00 (see Table 7).
I also subjected mean scores for jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s
responsibility/blameworthiness to a multiple regression using the same predictors, reference
groups, and steps as the previous analysis. Step 1 yielded an R2 = .03, F(5, 478) = 3.42, p < .01.
Jurors exposed to PTP perceived the defendant as significantly more responsible/blameworthy
(M = .17, SD = .93) than did non-exposed jurors (M = -.17, SD = .97), p < .001. Including the
interactions at Step 2 did not statistically significantly improve the model fit, Δ R2 = .01 (see
Table 8).
Finally, I examined possible differences between PTP exposure and jurors’ beliefs about
how much any bias would have impacted their decision making (item 10 on the juror
questionnaire). Jurors exposed to PTP expressed more belief that some bias would have impacted
their decision making (M = 1.61, SD = .85) than jurors not exposed to PTP (M = 1.44, SD = .70),
t(482) = -2.39, p = .02, d = -.22.
Verdicts
Although not part of our hypotheses but given attorneys’ reliance on stereotypes when
making decisions about who they want on the jury (Fulero & Penrod, 1990; Olczak et al., 1991),
I conducted a standard logistic regression to examine the effects of age, gender, race/ethnicity,
political affiliation, and income on participants’ verdicts. Political affiliation was recoded into
three groups (due to small n’s for libertarian party and green party, I merged these groups with
the “other” group): Democrat, Republican, and Other. Thus, two dummy-coded variables for
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political affililation were entered into the model with Democrat as the reference group. Gender
was recoded into two groups (excluding “non-binary/third gender” and “prefer no to say”, which
had low ns): male (reference group) and female. Race/ethnicity was recoded into five groups
(removing “American Indian/Alaska Native and Native American/Hawaiian, both of which had
ns of zero, and merging the “mixed” with the “other” group due to low ns in both): Whites
(reference group), Blacks, Hispanic/Latino, Asian American, and other. Age and income were
entered as covariates. All predictors were entered into the equation simultaneously. The overall
model was significant χ2(9, N = 484) = 28.4, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .08. Gender was a
significant predictor of verdicts, with women having almost twice the odds as men of voting
guilty, χ2(1, N = 484) = 10.81, p = .00, OR = 1.95, 95% CI [1.31, 2.91]. Among women, 60.5%
voted guilty compared to only 43.8% of men. Additionally, Blacks had over twice the odds as
Whites of voting guilty, χ2(4, N = 484) = 10.73, p < .01, OR = 2.22, 95% CI [1.31, 3.78].
Approximately half (50.4%) of Whites voted guilty compared to 68.5% of Blacks (see Table 9).
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Table 7
Juror Motivation and Confidence to Set Aside Bias as a Function of PTP Exposure, Reflection
Instructions, Judge’s Questioning, and Confederate Responses.
95% CI for
95% CI for
b
sr2
2
Variables in the equation
b
Lower Upper
t
p
sr
Lower Upper
Step 1
-1.86 .38 .01
-.17
PTP Present
-.35
.01
.01
.02
-0.00
1.00
.00
.00
Reflection
-.22
.22
.00
.01
0.65 .51 .00
.07
Reflection-No Writing
-.15
.29
.00
.01
0.33 .74 .00
.03
Open
-.15
.21
.00
.00
-1.10
.27
-.10
.00
Mixed
-.28
.08
-.01
.01
Step 2
-0.25 .80 .00
-.05
PTP Present
-.45
.35
-.00
.00
1.52 .13 .00
.34
Reflection
-.10
.78
-.01
.01
0.50
.62
.11
.00
Reflection-No Writing
-.33
.55
-.00
.00
1.24 .22 .00
.25
Open
-.15
.65
-.01
.01
Mixed
.04
-.36
.46
0.21 .83 .00
-.00
.00
PTP Present*Reflection
-.17
-.61
.27
-0.76 .45 .00
-.00
.01
PTP Present*Reflection-No
Writing
-.01
-.45
.43
-0.03 .97 .00
-.00
.00
PTP Present*Mixed
-.11
-.47
.25
-0.62 .54 .00
-.00
.00
PTP Present*Open
.00
-.36
.36
0.01 .99 .00
-.00
.01
Reflection*Open
-.26
-.70
.18
-1.16 .25 .00
-.01
.01
Reflection-No
Writing*Open
-.05
-.50
.39
-.24
.81 .00
-.00
.00
Reflection*Mixed
-.24
-.68
.20
-1.07 .29 .00
-.01
.01
Reflection-No Writing
*Mixed
-.02
-.46
.43
-.07
.95 .00
-.00
.00
Open*Mixed
-.11
-.47
.25
-.62
.54 .00
-.00
.01
2
Note. b represents standardized regression weights. sr represents the semi-partial correlation
squared. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant.
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Table 8
Defendant Responsibility and Blameworthiness as a Function of PTP Exposure, Reflection
Instructions, Judge’s Questioning, and Confederate Responses.
95% CI for
95% CI for
b
sr2
2
Variables in the equation
b
Lower Upper
t
p
sr
Lower Upper
Step 1
3.83 .00 .03
.35
PTP Present
.17
.52
-.00
06
0.05
.96
.00
.00
Reflection
-.21
.22
-.00
.00
-0.20 .84 .00
-.02
Reflection-No Writing
-.24
.20
-.00
.00
0.50 .61 .00
.05
Open
-.13
.22
-.00
.00
1.38
.17
.12
.00
Mixed
-.05
.30
-.01
.01
Step 2
1.81 .07 .01
.36
PTP Present
.03
.76
-.01
.02
0.88 .38 .00
-.19
Reflection
.63
.24
-.01
.01
0.78
.44
-.17
.00
Reflection-No Writing
.61
.26
-.00
.01
1.23 .22 .00
-.25
Open
.64
.15
-.00
.00
Mixed
.10
.30
.49
0.47 .64 .00
-.01
.01
PTP Present*Reflection
.14
.29
.57
0.64 .52 .00
-.00
.01
PTP Present*Reflection-No
Writing
-.00
.44
.43
0.02 .99 .00
-.00
.00
PTP Present*Mixed
-.03
.39
.32
0.18 .86 .00
-.00
.00
PTP Present*Open
-.10
.46
.25
0.58 .56 .00
-.00
.01
Reflection*Open
.29
.15
.72
1.30 .19 .00
-.01
.01
Reflection-No
Writing*Open
.44
.01
.88
2.01 .05 .01
-.01
.02
Reflection*Mixed
-.04
.47
.40
0.16 .87 .00
-.00
.00
Reflection-No Writing
*Mixed
-.14
.57
.30
0.62 .53 .00
-.00
.01
Open*Mixed
.20
.15
.56
1.12 .26 .00
-.01
.01
2
Note. b represents standardized regression weights. sr represents the semi-partial correlation
squared. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant.
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Table 9
Effects of Demographic Variables on Guilty Verdicts.
Variables in the equation

B
.00
-.02
.67

SE
.01
.06
.20

Z
0.35
-0.40
3.27

p
.73
.69
.00

OR
1.00
0.98
1.95

95% CI for OR
Lower Upper
0.99
1.02
0.87
1.09
1.31
2.91

Age
Income
Female
Political Affiliation
Republican
-.48
.30 -1.63 .10
0.62
0.35
1.10
Other
-.33
.23 -.142 .16
0.72
0.46
1.14
Race/Ethnicity
Black
.80
.27
2.94
.00
2.22
1.31
3.78
Hispanic/Latino
.50
.30
1.68
.09
1.65
0.92
2.96
Asian American
.07
.41
0.18
.86
1.08
0.49
2.38
Other
.06
.31
0.19
.85
1.06
0.58
1.93
Note. CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio. Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1;
female = 1; Republican = 1; (political affiliation) other = 1; Black = 1; Hispanic/Latino = 1;
Asian American = 1; (race/ethnicity) other = 1. Z statistics calculated using the Wald method.
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Chapter 10: Discussion
Through this research, I sought to understand how, during juror rehabilitation, conformity
pressures from the judge and fellow jurors undermine jurors’ efforts to accurately self-report an
ability to be fair and impartial, as well as whether a reflection instruction could enhance the
accuracy of jurors’ self-reports and attenuate bias resulting from pre-trial publicity (PTP).
Results paint a glim reality of the process of juror rehabilitation. In line with previous research,
jurors exposed to PTP were significantly more likely to convict the defendant than their nonexposed counterparts, yet they were just as likely to report an ability to be fair and impartial
during voir dire. In fact, the overwhelming majority (98%) of mock jurors said they could be
impartial. These results suggest the process of juror rehabilitation is laden with such a
multiplicity of social desirability and conformity pressures that my efforts to minimize those
pressures were ineffective.
The fact that my efforts to minimize social influence were unsuccessful begs the question
of whether my conformity pressure manipulations (i.e., the judge’s instructions, confederate
responses, and the reflection instructions) worked. There is some evidence to suggest they did. In
response to the rehabilitation question, jurors in the closed conditions said less than jurors in the
open conditions. That is, as expected, they spoke more when a disclosure-enhancing questioning
style was used (Middendorf & Lugeinbuhl, 1995), but they were no less likely to say they could
be impartial. In addition, nine out of the ten jurors who expressed an inability to be fair and
impartial came from mixed, reflection conditions. Although this is a very small sample size, the
pattern is in the direction we would expect if these measures (i.e., variation in confederate-jurors’
responses to the rehabilitation question and giving jurors time to reflect on their case knowledge)
had successfully decreased conformity pressures and, in turn, resulted in more accurate
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responding. Indeed, every single one of the ten jurors who said they could not be impartial had
been exposed to PTP. Thus, there was some movement in the direction of more accurate
responding (though on a scale too small for it to be meaningful enough to suggest jurors are not,
by and large, overwhelmed by the pressure of the situation to respond in the affirmative).
Unfortunately, this is the only indicator that the confederate responses and reflection instruction
manipulations worked.
What remains unclear is whether conformity pressures are driven by the behavior of the
judge, fellow jurors, or both. Examining jurors’ self-reports is not particularly useful given our
limited ability to accurately introspect into the causes of our behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
It should therefore be taken with a grain of salt that, on average, jurors disagreed with statements
that “The judge influenced my response regarding my ability to be fair and impartial” and “The
responses of at least one of the jurors influenced my response regarding my ability to be fair and
impartial.” In fact, it makes sense that participants would not report feeling influenced by the
judge or their fellow jurors for this very reason.
Equally concerning to the situational pressures that appear to be inherent to the process of
rehabilitation are the individual pressures that people unknowingly put on themselves. Jurors
believed they could be unbiased. Jurors exposed to PTP were just as likely as those not exposed
to report feeling motivated and confident in their ability to set aside bias and be fair and
impartial. Research on the “bias blind spot” indicates people harbor a self-serving belief that they
are less susceptible to bias than others (Pronin et al., 2002; Pronin, 2007; Pronin & Kugler,
2007). People take their introspections at face value and perceptions as direct evidence of reality,
yet readily think others’ introspections and perceptions are flawed (Pronin, 2007). During voir
dire, jurors are not only being asked to admit bias—which has negative implications for the self
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(e.g., the self-concept, self-esteem, etc.), hence the desire to think we are unbiased being “selfserving”—but they are also being asked to acknowledge a bias that would make them stand out
from their fellow jurors in a profoundly negative way given the situation. To put it plainly, no
one wants to say they cannot be fair, especially not in a court of law with the judge, the attorneys
and members of the community watching, and not with phrases like “due process” and
“presumption of innocence” hanging in the air. The idea that jurors should be unbiased is far
from subtle: it is the expectation or norm of the situation and human nature makes jurors only
that much more likely to oblige. Changing that norm, at least in this research, proved to be far
more difficult than anticipated.
In the language of the Flexible Correction Model (Petty & Wegener, 1997), jurors may
have failed at any of the three steps of bias correction: awareness, motiviation, or direction. It is
possible some jurors were not aware of their bias, particularly those not asked to reflect on their
bias or those who felt this bias did not apply to them (i.e., the bias blind spot; Pronin et al.,
2002); it is possible jurors were aware of their bias but not motivated to correct for it because
they did not think it would influence their decision making (i.e., the bias blind spot again; Pronin
et al., 2002); and it is possible that they did not accurately calibrate for their bias because they
confused information heard in the PTP with information heard in the trial (i.e., they made source
monitoring errors; Johnson et al., 1992). As evidence against this first possibility (i.e., that jurors
did not have the requisite awareness), in response to the question that gets the closest to a selfassessment of the presence of bias—which asks jurors how much they believe any bias would
have influenced their decision making—jurors exposed to PTP expressed more belief that some
bias would have impacted their decision making than jurors not exposed to PTP. Specifically,
jurors exposed to PTP scored closer, on average, to the response option, “It would have biased
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me a little,” and jurors not exposed to PTP scored closer, on average, to the response option,
“Not applicable because I have no bias.” Although relying on self-report, given jurors exposed to
PTP were more likely to believe some bias would have impacted their decision making suggests
PTP jurors were correctly able to recognize their bias but simultaneously minimized its effects
on their decision making (i.e., by saying it would have only influenced them “a little”). As a
result, the second possibility—that they were not motivated to correct for their bias—or the third
possibility—that jurors could not accurately calibrate for their bias—may be more likely.
In support of the third possibility, the majority of critical source memory errors
(CSME’s) for jurors exposed to PTP were due to misattributing this information to both the trial
and the PTP (consistent with prior research by Ruva & McEvoy, 2008). Jurors correctly
remembered hearing it in the PTP, but they erroneously thought they had also heard it during
trial. As such, they may have made an attempt at bias correction and wanted to rely exclusively
on information heard during trial in rendering a verdict, but their efforts were undermined by
source memory errors in which information that should have been categorized as irrelevant was
instead categorized as relevant. It is likely, then, that jurors were either not motivated to correct
for bias because they thought they would be immune to its effects and/or did not have the tools to
correct for it as a result of errors in their source monitoring judgments that interefered with their
ability to successfully correct for bias.
Consistent with previous research by Ruva and colleagues (Ruva & Coy, 2020; Ruva &
Guenther, 2015, 2017; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008; Ruva et al., 2007), jurors exposed to PTP made
more CSME’s but fewer correct trial judgments than those not exposed to PTP. Stated
differently, jurors exposed to PTP made more source monitoring errors in general. In addition,
jurors exposed to PTP were more likely to find the defendant guilty than their non-exposed
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counterparts. However, inconsistent with previous research (Ruva & Guenther, 2015; Ruva et al.,
2007), CSME’s did not mediate the effect of PTP exposure on verdicts. One explanation for
these divergent findings is that Ruva and colleagues analyzed verdict ratings, or jurors’
confidence in their verdict decision rated on a 7-point scale, whereas I examined dichotomous
verdicts. A continuous rating scale is more sensitive than a binary one and therefore increases the
likelihood of detecting a statistically significant effect. In actual cases, however, jurors are asked
to make binary judgments about guilt, which renders my analysis more ecologically valid but
also less sensitive. As such, it is possible that in the context of PTP, jurors’ verdicts are
influenced by source monitoring errors to some degree, but not enough to sway jurors’ verdict
decisions on their own. In other words, it may be the additive effect of source monitoring errors
and other prejudicial consequences of PTP exposure—such as pre-judgment of guilt, predecisional distortion, decreased defendant credibility and negative emotions—through which
PTP exerts its biasing effect on jurors’ dichotomous verdict decisions.
Another explanation for the discrepancy between my mediation results and past research
is that jurors in my study were not asked to deliberate. Ruva and Guenther (2015) and Ruva et al.
(2007) had jurors deliberate and found support for a mediation, but my research and Ruva &
McEvoy’s research (2008) did not ask jurors to deliberate and did not find support for a
mediation. Importantly, Ruva and Guenther’s (2015) research suggests deliberation may
contribute to the undue influence that source monitoring errors exert on jurors’ and juries’
verdicts. During deliberations, jurors in their study who had been exposed to PTP often discussed
that information without making reference to its source, instead mentioning it as though it was
presented during trial and were rarely corrected by other jury members who had also been
exposed to PTP. As a result, PTP jurors were able to transfer their bias to their non-exposed
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counterparts through the process of deliberation, which may also explain why deliberation has
not previously proven itself to be a successful remedy for counteracting PTP bias (Ruva &
Guenther, 2015). In my study, it is possible that jurors’ CSME’s would have beeen more likely
to mediate the effect of PTP on verdicts had they also been asked to deliberate. Examining this
mediation in the context of jury deliberations is an excellent question for future research as my
study is the first to examine this relationship using dichotomous verdict decisions.
Jurors asked to reflect on their case knowledge (with or without writing) did not, contrary
to my hypotheses, make fewer CSME’s than those not asked to reflect; but, as expected, jurors
asked to reflect only (i.e., without writing) made more correct trial judgments. The reflection
exercise may have prepared jurors to remember information heard at trial by helping them focus
their mind. Specifically, the reflection exercise asked jurors to think about what they may have
learned about the case through the media and consider whether that information might make it
difficult for them to follow the law and focus on information only heard during trial in reaching a
verdict. This type of focused attention could be considered a practice in mindfulness.
Mindfulness has been defined as “a mental mode characterized by full attention to presentmoment experience without judgment, elaboration, or emotional reactivity” (Jha et al., 2010, p.
54). Mindfuless training elicits increased working memory capacity (Jha et al., 2010; Mrazek et
al., 2013; Quach et al., 2015) and although the reflection exercise in the present study was only a
couple of minutes long (compared to mindfulness trainings that can last several weeks), it may
have sufficiently encouraged jurors to concentrate on the task at hand (i.e., to focus on the
information presented in the trial video) and prevent mind wandering or interference from
distracting thoughts. The reflection exercise was unsuccessful, however, at helping jurors
remember what they had heard in the PTP, which may explain why they still made as many
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critical source monitoring errors as jurors not asked to reflect. What is unclear, however, is why
jurors asked to reflect and write did not exhibit this same effect of enhanced memory of trial
information relative to control participants. One possibility is that writing what they could
remember from the PTP was cognitively taxing and interrupted jurors’ ability to focus. Another
possibility, which may be the most likely, is that the small proportion of variance explained by
reflection without writing in correct trial judments (sr2 =.01) indicates this may not be a
meaningful effect and should be interpreted with caution.
Gender and race also predicted jurors’ verdicts, with women being more likely than men
to convict the defendant and specifically Blacks being more likely than Whites to convict the
defendant. These effects of gender and race are likely reflective of shared identity with the victim
(who was female) for women and shared identity with the defendant (who was White) for
Whites. There is a long tradition of research stemming from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) that finds ingroup members, or those with whom people share a social identity, are
viewed more positively and are more influential than outgroup members, or those not a part of
the social ingroup (e.g., Adarves-Horno et al., 2008; Ellemers et al., 1999; Haslam, 2001;
Hewstone et al., 2002). In the psycho-legal literature, this idea of jurors liking defendants more
similar to themselves and treating them more leniently as a result has been termed the similarityleniency hypothesis (Davis et al., 1977; Kerr et al., 1995). For women, their identification with
the victim could have caused them to be less likely to believe the defendant’s story of suicide
and more likely to believe he had killed her, in turn causing increased punitiveness. In the
context of race, Whites may have been less likely than Blacks to convict but no less likely than
Asians or Hispanics because of the cultural climate in which data was collected (January through
October of 2020), which has made salient issues of systemic racism in the United States,
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particularly in the criminal justice system. Rather than viewing Whites in the present study as
having been more lenient towards the defendant than Blacks, it may actually be that Blacks
treated the defendant more harshly because he was White. In would not be the first time that
jurors have used their verdict decisions to relay the sentiment of the more widespread community
(e.g., Brigham & Wasserman, 1999).
One limitation of my research, which has already been alluded to earlier in the
discussion, is that it remains unclear from where pressure to respond to the rehabilitation
question in the affirmative is coming. Given the lack of variance in jurors’ responses to the
rehabilitation question, I could not evaluate whether pressure was coming from the judge and/or
fellow jurors. That is, pressure may be coming from the judge, whose status as an authority
figure (e.g., Aronson et al., 1974) can signal to jurors the socially desirable response (Markus &
Zajonc, 1985). It may be coming from fellow jurors who can similarly signal to jurors the
socially desirable response through normative influence (i.e., where jurors conform to the
behavior of other jurors because of their desire for approval and fear of ostracism; Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955). And although not part of the aims of my research, it is also possible that jurors are
saying they can be impartial because they do not think they are biased or because they think their
bias will not impact their decision making (in line with research on the bias blind spot; e.g.,
Pronin et al., 2002). Importantly, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. They may all be
true to some degree, which would make enhancing the accuracy of jurors’ responses to the
rehabilitation question in its current form all the more challenging.
Another limitation of the present research is that my trial stimulus, although consisting of
a professionally made videotaped reenactment of actual trial footage, ran only 34 minutes, which
is much shorter than actual trials. In addition, the entire voir dire process in my study was
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conducted by a judge, whereas in actual trials attorneys would also be conducting the
questioning (although it is always the judge who rehabilitates jurors in actual cases).
Confederate-jurors averaged a few years younger than participants on average (M’s = 28 and 34,
respectively), which may have undermined their ability to exert influence over participants.
However, this age gap is not particularly large or necessarily physically noticeable and there
were two confederate-jurors for each participant. (This concern is alleviated by the fact that
virtually all of my participants said they could be fair and impartial, in which case the issue is not
necessarily that my confederate-jurors could not sufficiently exert influence but instead that I
was unsuccessful at lessening their influence, if anything). Finally, jurors in my study were not
asked to deliberate to a unanimous decision, which is a requirement in actual trials.
What can be gleaned from my research is that this heavily relied on practice of juror
rehabilitation as a solution for combatting PTP bias is being done in vain. Despite my efforts to
attenuate conformity pressures and provide jurors the opportunity to more accurately respond to
the rehabilitation question, an astonishing proportion of jurors said they could set aside their bias
and be impartial. The solution, first and foremost, should not be to turn to one of the other
previously used remedies for PTP bias as they are either ineffective, can backfire, or are rarely
granted (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Muskal, 2015; Robertson et al., 2013; Steblay et al., 1999;
Steblay et al., 2006; Studebaker & Penrod, 2005). In fact, in death penalty cases where a change
of venue—which is considered one of the only worthwhile solutions as it altogether avoids
recruiting a venire with extensive media exposure about the case—is the most warranted given
the high profile and high stakes nature of those cases, requests for change of venues are rarely
granted (Bakhshay & Haney, 2018).
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Ideally, the solution would be to automatically eliminate all jurors who express exposure
to PTP during voir dire. My results indicate that what predicts PTP bias is not how much PTP
jurors mention during voir dire (i.e., the number of PTP items mentioned), but rather the fact that
they have been exposed to PTP at all. In other words, the extent of their knowledge and, in turn,
their bias, cannot be adequately assessed during voir dire because jurors are not able to report the
extent of their PTP knowledge accurately. This inability to accurately self-report is unsurprising
given that jurors are often asked to report on this information quickly and publicly but is
particularly concerning given that they are no better at doing it when given time to reflect on that
information and instructed on the seriousness of the issue of PTP bias, as was the case in my
research. The only reliable indicator of PTP bias, then, is fact that they had any exposure to PTP.
While electing to excuse all jurors who admit to having heard any information about the
case from the media will likely be less than ideal in the eyes of the courts as it will require more
time and resources to recruit additional prospective jurors, this concern can be alleviated by
asking jurors about their case knowledge prior to their arrival to the courthouse in a juror
questionnaire. If the courts took a stricter approach to PTP bias, attorneys would then be able to
excuse jurors who expressed any case knowledge prior to jury selection. Some courts have
already acknowledged the utility of juror questionnaires for streamlining the process of voir dire
(Hans & Jehle, 2003). For example, jurors in the George Floyd case, which is expected to begin
March of 2021, are being screened using a questionnaire that includes questions about their case
knowledge and attitudes (remarkably, the rehabilitation question is also a part of the
questionnaire). One downside to using juror questionnaires is that the courts will likely continue
to use it as a metric for evaluating the extent of jurors’ case knowledge. My results suggest jurors
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are less forthcoming when asked to write about their knowledge than when asked to report on
their knowledge verbally.
Another, possibly more digestible, option would be for judges to ask the rehabilitation
question to jurors in private (Mize, 1999). Although this modification would be more time
consuming and is less than ideal from a psychological standpoint as the judge still maintains his
role as an authority figure and private questioning may actually function to heighten anxiety by
being in such close proximity to the judge—indeed, prior research finds judges are less effective
than attorneys for promoting honest disclosure (Jones, 1987; Nietzel & Dillehay, 1982; Suggs &
Sales, 1980)—it may help eliminate other situational pressures. Even better, counsel from both
sides or a neutral third party, such as a court-appointed magistrate, could ask jurors the
rehabilitation question in private. Future research should examine how private questioning from
different sources fares relative to public questioning for eliciting accurate responses to the
rehabilitation question.
A final, more creative option and avenue for future research stems from a jury selection
procedure that is currently being used in Canada. Referred to as the “challenge for cause”
procedure (Schuller et al., 2015; Schuller et al., 2009; Schuller & Vidmar, 2011; Vidmar, 1997;
Vidmar & Schuller, 2001), jurors are tasked with assessing other jurors’ ability to be fair and
impartial in cases where there may be racial animus against the defendant. Their “challenge”
question is essentially the equivalent of our rehabilitation question in the United States. In this
procedure, two individuals from the jury panel are randomly selected as “triers,” sworn in, and
instructed by the judge that they must listen to the responses they will hear and decide whether to
accept or reject that person onto the jury (Schuller et al., 2015). Another “prospective” juror is
then called forward, asked the challenge question by the judge, and responds—often in a yes/no
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format. The two triers then confer with one another to reach a unanimous decision about whether
to accept that individual onto the jury. As in the United States, if the prospective juror is deemed
acceptable, the Crown (Canada’s version of the prosecution) and the defense can use a
peremptory challenge to remove that individual. If the juror is deemed unacceptable that
individual is excused, and a new juror is randomly selected. From a psychological standpoint,
this procedure may be better than our “rehabilitation” procedure for two reasons. First, social
psychological theory on social interaction (Goffman, 1959) posits that when people are out of
public purview and not expected to behave a certain way (e.g., in the jury room), they may
display behaviors more in line with their comfort zone—referred to as “backstage
performances”—and that when they are in public spaces (e.g., the courtroom), they may act in
ways to meet the expectations of their audience (e.g., the judge) and achieve a desired
response—referred to as “frontstage performances”. As a result, jurors are provided with
information about their peers in the common jury room that judges do not have access to which
can make them better evaluators of their peers’ abilities to be impartial. Second, by having jurors
assess other jurors’ ability to be impartial it avoids strict reliance on jurors’ self-reports of
impartiality, which we know are inherently biased by people’s inability to see bias in themselves
(Pronin et al., 2002). The Canadian “challenge for cause” procedure could be adapted for use in
the American system for assessment of not just racial bias but other forms of bias well.
In sum, current legal remedies for counteracting the prejudicial impact of pre-trial
publicity—including the focus of my research, juror rehabilitation—are ineffective. Jurors in my
study overwhelmingly reported an ability to be impartial during voir dire and still exhibited bias
from pre-trial publicity when it came time to render a verdict. Given the widespread use of the
practice of juror rehabilitation (e.g., Studebaker & Penrod, 2005) it is critical the courts seek a
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better solution and rid themselves of a practice that is not saving time but wasting it. Inaccurate
self-reporting creates additional litigation and thus requires more of the court’s invaluable time
and resources. Inaccurate self-reporting precludes defendants’ constitutional right to trial by a
fair and impartial jury under the 6th and 14th amendments. And inaccurate self-reporting can
undermine the prosecution’s ability to prove guilt, since bias resulting form pretrial publicity can
be both anti-defense and anti-prosecution (Ruva & Coy, 2020). Concern about this practice
should be felt by all parties involved in the criminal justice system.
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APPENDIX A: SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What is your age? ____
2. Are you a U.S. citizen? Yes/No
3. Can you communicate well (in terms of reading, writing, speaking, listening) in English?
Yes/No
[Next, online informed consent form presented to eligible participants. Information below to
be requested after informed consent form has been agreed to.]
Name:_________________________
Email address:__________________________
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APPENDIX B: CRAIGSLIST AD FOR IN PERSON SESSIONS
Paid Participation in Decision-Making Study
Seeking participants for a paid psychology study on decision-making. This study will require
reading some news articles online before the in-person portion of the study. The in-person
portion of the study will be done in group setting. The study is being conducted by researchers at
John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
The study takes approximately 1-1.25 hours to complete, in person. All who participate in the
full amount of time will each receive cash compensation in the amount of $40.
Please complete a brief (3 question) screening survey by clicking the following link {link will be
inserted here} so that we may determine your eligibility for participation in this study. The
survey will not require you to provide any identifying information. Please note that by clicking
this link, you consent to participating in the screening process. Eligible participants will be
contacted to schedule a time to come in for the study. After signing up for a study session, you
will receive an additional e-mail with links to 9 news articles and complete a brief questionnaire.
The questionnaire will assess your knowledge of the information you read about in the news
articles. If you answer too many questions incorrectly, you will not be eligible to participate in
the in-person portion of the study. You will not receive compensation for participating in the
online portion of the study. Only participants who participate in the online and in-person study
will receive compensation. It should take no more than 15-20 minutes to read the news articles
and complete the online survey. You must read the articles and complete the brief questionnaire
at least 24 hours prior to your study session in order to be eligible to participate.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX C: CRAIGSLIST AD FOR ONLINE SESSIONS
Paid Participation in Decision-Making Study
Seeking participants for a paid psychology study on decision-making. This study will be
completed ONLINE. Prior to signing up for the study, you will need to read some news articles
online. The main portion of the study will be done in a group setting using Zoom
videoconferencing. In order to participate in this study, you will need to have audio and video
capabilities enabled and be able to complete the study on a laptop or computer in a private, quiet
room without distraction. The study is being conducted by researchers at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice (IRB Study #: 2019-0477).
•
•

The study takes approximately 1-1.25 hours to complete.
All who participate in the full amount of time will each receive cash compensation in the
amount of $40.

Please complete a brief (3 question) screening survey by copying and pasting the link below into
your browser: https://gccunyep.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_dclQrFAsOvgNyWV
The survey will not require you to provide any identifying information. Please note that by going
to the above link, you consent to participating in the screening process. Eligible participants will
be contacted to schedule a study session.
Please note the following: After signing up for a study session, you will receive an additional email with links to 9 news articles and complete a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire will
assess your knowledge of the information you read about in the news articles. If you answer too
many questions incorrectly, you will not be eligible to participate in the study portion of the
study and you will not receive any compensation. Only participants who participate in the Zoom
portion of the study will receive compensation. It should take no more than 15-20 minutes to
read the news articles and complete the online survey. You must read the articles and complete
the brief questionnaire at least 24 hours prior to your study session in order to be eligible to
participate.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX D: ONLINE INFORMED CONSENT FOR IN PERSON SESSIONS
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
ORAL AND INTERNET-BASED INFORMED CONSENT SCRIPT
Title of Research Study:
Principal Investigator:

Decision Making Study
Margaret Kovera, PhD
and
Natalie Gordon, MA

Thank you for your interest in our research study.
You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are at least 18 years old, a
U.S. citizen, and proficient in English. The purpose of this research study is to assess decision
making.
•

•
•
•

•

•

If you agree to participate in the online portion of the study, we will ask you to read nine
news articles and answer a brief questionnaire about the articles you have read online
before coming in for the in-person portion of the study. You will need to read the news
articles carefully. Participants who do not answer most of the questions on the
questionnaire correctly will be notified that they are no longer eligible for participation in
the study.
The online portion of the study should take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete.
You will not be compensated for participating in the online portion of the study. Only
participants who also come in for the in-person portion of the study will be compensated.
If you agree to participate in the online portion of the study by clicking “yes” after reading
this form, we will ask you to provide your name and email so that we may contact you to
schedule a time for you to come in to the lab to participate in the in-person portion of the
study. Once you have scheduled a time to come in to the lab, we will send you an e-mail
with the news articles and the questionnaire.
We will not ask for any other identifying or personal information beyond name and e-mail,
but if you are not comfortable providing either piece of information you will not be able to
sign up for the study. Once you have signed up for the study, read the articles, and
completed the questionnaire, your name and e-mail will be deleted from our database,
regardless of whether you are still eligible for participation. If you decide to withdraw from
the online portion of the study at any time, your information will be deleted.
Although the news articles you will read are not expected to cause you any distress, if you
find yourself uncomfortable while reading these news articles, you may withdraw from the
study at any time and your information will be deleted.
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•
•
•

Participating in this study will provide you the opportunity to be involved in psychological
research and contribute to knowledge on decision-making.
We will make our best efforts to keep your contact information and answers to the
questionnaire confidential. No one except for the research team will have access to your
answers.
We might remove identifiers from the information collected from you as part of this study
and use it for future research studies or distribute it to another investigator for future
research studies without additional informed consent.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you have any questions, you can contact Natalie
Gordon at nagordon@jjay.cuny.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant or if you would like to talk to someone other than the researchers, you can contact
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or HRPP@cuny.edu.
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APPENDIX E: ONLINE INFORMED CONSENT FOR ONLINE SESSIONS
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology

ORAL AND INTERNET-BASED INFORMED CONSENT SCRIPT
Title of Research Study:
Decision Making Study
Principal Investigator:
Margaret Kovera, PhD and
Natalie Gordon, MA
Thank you for your interest in our research study.
You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are at least 18 years old, a
U.S. citizen, and proficient in English. The purpose of this research study is to assess decision
making.
•

•
•

•

•

•
•

If you agree to participate in the first online portion of the study, we will ask you to read
nine news articles and answer a brief questionnaire. You will need to read the news
articles carefully. Participants who do not answer most of the questions on the
questionnaire correctly will be notified that they are no longer eligible for participation in
the main (also online) portion of the study.
This first portion of the study should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
You will not be compensated for participating in this portion of the study. Only
participants who pass this first portion of the study and who participate in the main
portion of the study (which should take approximately 60-75 minutes to complete) will
be compensated.
If you agree to participate in this portion of the study by clicking “yes” after reading this
form, we will ask you to provide your name and email so that we may contact you to
schedule a time for you to sign up for the main portion of the study. Once you have
scheduled a session, we will send you an e-mail with the news articles and the
questionnaire.
We will not ask for any other identifying or personal information beyond name and email, but if you are not comfortable providing either piece of information you will not be
able to sign up for the study. Once you have signed up for the study, read the articles, and
completed the questionnaire, your name and e-mail will be deleted from our database,
regardless of whether you are still eligible for participation. If you decide to withdraw
from this portion of the study at any time, your information will be deleted.
Although the news articles you will read are not expected to cause you any distress, if
you find yourself uncomfortable while reading these news articles, you may withdraw
from the study at any time and your information will be deleted.
Participating in this study will provide you the opportunity to be involved in
psychological research and contribute to knowledge on decision-making.
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•

We will make our best efforts to keep your contact information and answers to the
questionnaire confidential. No one except for the research team will have access to your
answers.
· We might remove identifiers from the information collected from you as part of this study
and use it for future research studies or distribute it to another investigator for future research
studies without additional informed consent.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you have any questions, you can contact
Natalie Gordon at nagordon@jjay.cuny.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a
research participant or if you would like to talk to someone other than the researchers, you can
contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or HRPP@cuny.edu.
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APPENDIX F: INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR IN PERSON SESSIONS
The City University of New York
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Title: Decision Making Study
Principal Investigator: Margaret Kovera, PhD
and
Natalie Gordon, MA
Faculty Advisor: Margaret Kovera, PhD
Research Sponsor: National Science Foundation
You are being asked to be in a research study because you are at least 18 years old, a U.S.
citizen, and proficient in English, and because you correctly answered most of the questions on
the online questionnaire.
Introduction
The purpose of this research study is to examine juror decision-making. The study will be
conducted in a group setting and audio and video recorded. If you are uncomfortable
participating in a study with others or being recorded, this study may not be suitable for you.
You will also later be asked to watch a videotape of a murder trial. If you anticipate that
watching a criminal trial will make you uncomfortable, this study may not be suitable for you.
Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
• Participate in a mock voir dire (jury selection procedure) where you and other mock jurors
will be asked questions by a judge about your background (e.g., where you live, what you
do for work) and ability to serve as a juror.
• Watch a 30-minute video of a murder trial.
• Complete two questionnaires.
Audio Recording/Video Recording
To ensure the accuracy of our findings, the mock voir dire will be audio and video recorded for
review by the research team. You cannot participate in this study if you do not consent to audio
and video recording. If you change your mind about participating, the recording from this session
will be deleted.
Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 1-1.25 hours.
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Potential Risks or Discomforts:
• We do not believe this research poses any risks to you, but there may be potential for
psychological discomfort if you have concerns about interacting with strangers while
being videotaped or watching material about a murder trial. However, if you experience
discomfort from being audio or video recorded or from discussing things in social
settings with strangers, you may stop at any time. If you know in advance that being
recorded will cause you discomfort, or you do not want to participate in a study that
involves interacting with other people, you may want to reconsider participating in this
study. You will not be identified by name in the recordings, but your face will be shown.
We will keep the recordings in our private laboratory space on a password protected
computer, but if you know in advance that this will cause you discomfort, you may want
to reconsider participating in the study.
• Additionally, the videotape you will watch involves a description of a murder and as such
poses the potential risk of inducing anxiety or other psychological distress. If you are
particularly sensitive to this subject, you may want to reconsider participating in this
study. However, there are no gruesome photographs shown during the video. If you
should experience discomfort while watching the videotape, you may stop at any time.
Potential Benefits:
• You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study.
• Your participation in this study will provide insight into decision making processes.
Payment for Participation:
You will receive $40 for your participation. If you choose to withdraw from the study at any time,
your compensation will be pro-rated (i.e., you will be compensated for the amount of time you
participated as a percentage of the expected study time).
New Information:
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your
willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality:
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected during
this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only with your
permission or as required by law.
The data obtained will be collected via digital equipment and written documents. The collected
data will only be accessible to the principal investigators and their direct assistants working on the
study. The researchers will protect your confidentiality by coding and securely storing the data.
The collected data will be stored only on the principle investigators’ computers. This digital data
will only be used for coding and analysis. Any written documents will be stored in locked filing
cabinets in the principal investigators’ offices. All personal identity will remain anonymous as it
pertains to the publishing of any results from the study.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, the National Science Foundation, and government
agencies that oversee this type of research may have access to research data and records in order
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to monitor the research. Research records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not
contain identifiable information about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this
study will not identify you by name.
The data from this study will be shared with the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/) so that
other researchers can use and analyze the data. This will include only de-identified data,
meaning data that cannot be used to identify you. The audio recordings and video recordings will
not be shared and will be deleted three years after this project is complete.
Participants’ Rights:
•

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled.

•

You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time,
without any penalty.

Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the
following researchers:
Natalie Gordon, MA
PhD Candidate, Adjunct Professor

Margaret Kovera, PhD
Presidential Scholar and Professor

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019
-Office: 10.63.23 NB
Email: nagordon@jjay.cuny.edu

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019
Ph: (212) 484-1112
Office: 10.65.02 NB
Email: mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant:
If you agree to be audiotaped and videotaped, please indicate this below.
_________ I agree to be audiotaped and videotaped
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_________ I do NOT agree to be audiotaped and videotaped
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be given a
copy of this consent form to keep.
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
_____________________________________________________
Signature of Participant
__________________________
Date
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent
_____________________________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent
__________________________
Date
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APPENDIX G: INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR ONLINE SESSIONS
The City University of New York
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Title: Decision Making Study
Principal Investigator: Margaret Kovera, PhD
and
Natalie Gordon, MA
Faculty Advisor: Margaret Kovera, PhD
Research Sponsor: National Science Foundation
You are being asked to be in a research study because you are at least 18 years old, a U.S.
citizen, and proficient in English, and because you correctly answered most of the questions on
the online questionnaire.
Introduction
The purpose of this research study is to examine juror decision-making. The study will be
conducted in a group setting online using Zoom video conferencing and audio and video
recorded. If you are uncomfortable participating in a study with others or being recorded, this
study may not be suitable for you. You will also later be asked to watch a videotape of a murder
trial. If you anticipate that watching a criminal trial will make you uncomfortable, this study may
not be suitable for you.
Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
• Participate in a mock voir dire (jury selection procedure) where you and other mock jurors
will be asked questions by a judge about your background (e.g., where you live, what you
do for work) and ability to serve as a juror.
• Watch a 30-minute video of a murder trial.
• Complete two questionnaires.
Audio Recording/Video Recording
To ensure the accuracy of our findings, the mock voir dire will be audio and video recorded for
review by the research team. You cannot participate in this study if you do not consent to audio
and video recording. If you change your mind about participating, the recording from this session
will be deleted.
Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 1-1.25 hours.
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Potential Risks or Discomforts:
• We do not believe this research poses any risks to you, but there may be potential for
psychological discomfort if you have concerns about interacting with strangers while
being videotaped or watching material about a murder trial. However, if you experience
discomfort from being audio or video recorded or from discussing things in social
settings with strangers, you may stop at any time. If you know in advance that being
recorded will cause you discomfort, or you do not want to participate in a study that
involves interacting with other people, you may want to reconsider participating in this
study. You will not be identified by name in the recordings, but your face will be shown.
We will keep the recordings in our private laboratory space on a password protected
computer, but if you know in advance that this will cause you discomfort, you may want
to reconsider participating in the study.
• Both Zoom and Venmo have extensive and thorough privacy policies in place to ensure
that your personal information is protected (see here: https://zoom.us/privacy and
https://venmo.com/legal/us-privacy-policy). There is minimal risk that your data will be
exposed to third parties, however, if you are uncomfortable using either of these
applications, you may choose to withdraw from the study at any time. We outline how we
will ensure the confidentiality of your data in the Confidentiality section below.
• Additionally, the videotape you will watch involves a description of a murder and as such
poses the potential risk of inducing anxiety or other psychological distress. If you are
particularly sensitive to this subject, you may want to reconsider participating in this
study. However, there are no gruesome photographs shown during the video. If you
should experience discomfort while watching the videotape, you may stop at any time.
Potential Benefits:
• You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study.
• Your participation in this study will provide insight into decision making processes.
Payment for Participation:
You will receive $40 for your participation through Venmo. If you choose to withdraw from the
study at any time, your compensation will be pro-rated (i.e., you will be compensated for the
amount of time you participated as a percentage of the expected study time).
New Information:
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your
willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality:
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected during
this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only with your
permission or as required by law.
The data obtained will be collected via digital equipment. The collected data will only be accessible
to the principal investigators and their direct assistants working on the study. The researchers will
protect your confidentiality by coding and securely storing the data. The collected data will be
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stored only on the principle investigators’ password-protected computers. This digital data will
only be used for coding and analysis. All personal identity will remain anonymous as it pertains to
the publishing of any results from the study.
Because this study is being conducted using Zoom video conferencing, we ensure your
confidentiality by only recording the necessary portions of the Zoom meeting and storing that
information to the cloud, which only the primary investigator will have access to. Zoom’s privacy
policy guarantees that “We have robust and validated access controls to prevent unauthorized
access to meeting recordings saved to the Zoom cloud.” Regardless, immediately after each study
session, your recording will be offloaded to the primary investigator’s computer and deleted from
the cloud, thus further ensuring that only the researcher and direct research assistants have access
to those files.
You will be paid for this study using Venmo and to ensure your confidentiality, the payment will
be made using the “private” setting so that only you and the primary investigator will be able to
view and comment on that payment on your Venmo account (i.e., it will NOT be public). Venmo
ensures that “personal information is protected by physical, electronic and procedural safeguards
in compliance with applicable US federal and state regulations, and that they also use computer
safeguards such as firewalls and data encryption.”
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, the National Science Foundation, and government
agencies that oversee this type of research may have access to research data and records in order
to monitor the research. Research records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not
contain identifiable information about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this
study will not identify you by name.
The data from this study will be shared with the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/) so that
other researchers can use and analyze the data. This will include only de-identified data,
meaning data that cannot be used to identify you. The audio recordings and video recordings will
not be shared and will be deleted three years after this project is complete.
Participants’ Rights:
•

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled.

•

You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time,
without any penalty.

Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of the
following researchers:
Natalie Gordon, MA

Margaret Kovera, PhD
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PhD Candidate, Adjunct Professor

Presidential Scholar and Professor

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019
Ph: (212) 484-1112
Office: 10.65.02 NB
Email:

Office: 10.63.23 NB
Email: nagordon@jjay.cuny.edu
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternately, you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
You will not be asked to sign this consent form but will be asked to confirm, verbally, that
you consent to participate and that you agree to the audio and video recording.
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Date: SUNDAY, April 29, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: THIRD
Memo: All the cases in this series are real, but in respect for their privacy, the parents' names
have been changed.
LATE SUPPORT CHECKS POINTED WAY TO
DOMESTIC RELATIONS OFFICE MESS
TOM MOYLAN and ROSA SALTER, Sunday Call-Chronicle
Right before Christmas 2015, Ann Negoescu of Nazareth noticed her weekly child support
checks from the Northampton County Domestic Relations Office were routinely coming late - up
to six weeks late in some cases. She was getting behind in paying her bills, and she was angry.
Finally in March she set up a meeting with then-Deputy Domestic Relations Director William N.
Davison.
He gave Negoescu a computer printout on her case, but because she knew her ex-husband was
up-to-date on his payments to the domestic relations office, she continued asking questions about
why their checks to her were arriving so late. Then, she said, he became impatient.
''When I asked him how much interest they were earning when these checks were held back, he
said, with the thumb over the shoulder, 'Look, just get out of here.'
''I was so shocked I just walked out.'' (Later, Davison called Negoescu's version of the story
''biased'' and doubted her checks were arriving as late as she claimed.)
A few days later, on St. Patrick's Day 2016, Renee Godshalk, a 23-year-old computer operator in
the county domestic relations office, was arrested for embezzling child support payments.
Exactly how much is missing is still undetermined, but it could be as much as $84,000. Another
$30,000 also may be missing either through mismanagement or theft by other parties.
Before Godshalk's arrest, questions about late or missing support checks were rarely heard
beyond the confines of the domestic relations office in the basement of the Northampton County
Government Center.
But by fall 2016, the head of the domestic relation’s office - Joseph V. Hollshwandner - had
stepped down and a routine office theft had become a major legislative investigation that
uncovered examples of mismanagement and negligence that shocked the community.
The investigation produced testimony that:
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- Although the office handled more than $8 million a year in child support payments, the
checking account on which support checks were written was not reconciled for as long as 23
months, meaning that a theft could go unnoticed.
- The domestic relations computer had flaws that could be used to print support checks when no
money was credited to an account, flaws which were used to cover stolen cash payments and
used to cover up thousands of dollars in cash which were missing from a cash bag.
- Some cash child support payments from fathers were held for days, months or even years
before they were deposited into the account. Whether their children ever got any money isn't
known.
Northampton County - whose domestic relations office boasted an advanced case-tracking
system, one of the highest collection rates in the state and which some area lawyers still say is
more efficient, fairer in setting support amounts and tougher on enforcement of support orders
than other area counties - suddenly found itself with a domestic relations office gone awry.
During testimony, prosecutors and county councilmen summed up the situation in various ways.
''A mess,'' one called it. ''A slipshod operation,'' said another. Local newspapers, eager to expose
the scandal, dubbed the affair ''Domestigate.''

Date WEDNESDAY, May 2, 2017
Page: B04
Edition: THIRD
DOMESTIC RELATIONS EMPLOYEE ACCUSED OF EMBEZZELING CHILD
SUPPORT FUNDS
The Morning Call
The first indication of a problem came in October 2015 when the checking account into which
fathers' child support payments were deposited and from which mothers' support checks were
written suddenly became overdrawn. The initial overdraft was $5,260. An informal accounting
later put the amount of support money missing at around $85,000.
One reason the shortages weren't detected sooner was that domestic relations simply wasn't
balancing its checkbook on time. The accounting firm of Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. had
warned as far back as 2014 that the checking account wasn't being reconciled with bank
statements on a ''timely basis.'' According to testimony, the domestic relations computer system
was designed to do the job automatically, but couldn't because the bank didn't produce the
information in a compatible computer format.
By March, mothers like Ann Negoescu were complaining that they weren't getting support
checks even though the fathers could show receipts of their payments to the domestic relations
office.
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Working nights and weekends, domestic relations officials were able to document that $9,450 in
support payments were embezzled by computer operator Renee L. Godshalk. She was arrested,
jailed and asked by baffled officials to trace her thefts.
Godshalk told officials she would take a cash support payment from a father, ring it up on a cash
register and give the father a receipt. She would later pocket the cash and destroy the office
receipt. She would then wait until a second father paid his support with a check in the same
amount as the cash payment. She credited the check to the first fathers' account. The computer
would print a check for the first man's ex-wife but the second man's ex-wife wouldn't get any
money until Godshalk used a third fathers' check to cover the second mans' account.
Because cash register tapes were never checked, no one noticed a difference between the amount
of money the tape said was received and how much money was on hand at the end of the day.
Since most of the custodial parents eventually got their support checks, Godshalk also counted
on their silence about the lateness of the checks. When someone did complain that a check wasn't
received, Godshalk would take care of the complaint by covering it with a support payment from
another man.
Domestic relations ''sometimes tended to be tough on women who complained they didn't get
their check,'' Dist. Atty. Donald B. Corriere told county council. Mothers, he said, would ''gripe''
about a missing support check but would forget about it after other checks started coming
regularly. As a result, Corriere said, ''there was a tendency for those complaints to be so isolated
that they weren't of any significance, at least to Miss Godshalk.''
In this way, she was able to embezzle money from the system that no one really missed - until
January 2016, when a domestic relations accountant found some of the misapplied checks.
Corriere says he's satisfied that Godshalk took $9,450, but because former Deputy Domestic
Relations Director William N. Davison says she took more than $84,000 using this and another
scheme, Corriere has asked the state auditor general for an independent determination of how
much was taken and how it was done.

Date: FRIDAY, May 4, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: THIRD
COMPUTER FLAW BLAMED FOR
ENABLING THEFT OF CHILD SUPPORT FUNDS
The Morning Call
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A Northampton County Council committee investigating embezzlements and mismanagement in
the county domestic relations office will hold one more public hearing and then issue its final
report within the next four to six months.
Davison, who was appointed director of the office after Hollshwandner resigned, testified that
Godshalk took another $54,493 under another scheme in which she relied on a flaw in a
computer program to cover missing money. He says she would pocket a cash payment and
destroy the office receipt but would tell the computer that the father had paid. The computer
would then print a check for the mother.
Davison says Godshalk could do that because on certain days when the flawed program was
used, there was no way the amount of cash received could be reconciled with the checks that
were printed.
The money wasn't missed because there was always a ''float'' in the checking account totaling
thousands of dollars. Since the checkbook wasn't balanced regularly, no one noticed the bogus
checks and cash shortage.
Domestic relations officials say that to prevent either scheme from being used again, duties are
now separated so that the same person doesn't accept support payments and post them in the
computer. The computer flaw was corrected, and officials also say they now check the payments
received each day and that the checking account is reconciled twice a month.
Although Godshalk pleaded guilty in June 2016 to taking more than $84,000, she recanted in
August, saying she took ''substantially less.'' In a sworn statement, she said she was told to take
the blame for the larger amount by Davison, who said the judges wanted to avoid adverse
publicity and provide an excuse for the large sums of missing money.
An out-of-county judge (appointed after a Northampton County judge removed himself to avoid
the appearance of a conflict of interest), accepted Godshalk's motion to postpone her trial until
the state auditor general can determine how much money Godshalk actually took. That report is
expected to be released in a week or so.
In the meantime, Godshalk is out on bail, working at another job and awaiting trial for her role in
the ''Domestigate'' scandal.
While Godshalk used a computer flaw to cover her theft of support money, County Controller
Kenneth A. Florey found that the same flaw was also used by an office accountant to remove
money that was supposedly deposited in the checking account by mistake. The accountant used
the flaw to print support checks made payable to mothers or fathers but which were instead
deposited in a domestic relations savings account.
''It is clear that this was simply an operation of robbing Peter to pay Paul since the funds were
simply shifted from one domestic relations account to another without proper validation,'' he
said.
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A computer flaw also resulted in some people getting ''duplicate checks,'' or extra payments they
weren't supposed to get.
The president of the computer-consulting firm hired by domestic relations, Schuylkill Computer
Services (SCS) of Schuylkill Haven, estimated that 25-50 such checks were printed totaling
around $2,800.
Davison and the county court administrator say that as much as $20,000 in support money cannot
be accounted for because of a variety of computer problems including the duplicate check
problem. Until the exact figure is determined, SCS has placed $38,905 in escrow to cover money
which might be missing because of computer problems.
On learning that checks went out in error but weren't returned, County Councilman Richard T.
Grucela said, ''It's a sad commentary that not one honest person was found in 25-50 people to call
up or come in and say, 'Why do I have this check?' ''

Date: SUNDAY, May 6, 2017
Page: B02
Edition: THIRD
MISMANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS OFFICE RESULTS IN
DELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
The Morning Call
The investigation into embezzlements and mismanagement in the county domestic relations
office revealed that some fathers' support payments were apparently sitting in the office
undeposited for days, weeks, months or years. Some of those payments were used to help replace
several thousand dollars missing from an office cash bag.
One of those payments, a money order dated Aug. 31, 2012, was three years and eight months
old when it was deposited. Even then, it went not into the checking account with other support
money, but into a savings account.
''Apparently,'' County Controller Kenneth A. Florey said, ''these were checks that were laying
around the office and for which the cases were closed or there was some error in terms of
depositing.'' He is still investigating to whom that money belongs and questions why Lafayette
Trust Bank of Easton accepted $3,500 worth of checks made out to actual clients of the support
system but not endorsed by those payees.
It's not known if any mothers or children went without support checks because of payments that
were left undeposited, although domestic relations officials have insisted that no fathers went to
jail because their support payments were misappropriated and that no beneficiaries lost support
money. (One reason for that is that $135,000 was borrowed from the savings account to cover
the overdrawn checking accounts and to reimburse fathers whose money was misappropriated.)
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Davison says support payments are now deposited daily and are not held under any
circumstances. Support checks, he says, are distributed to mothers ''within one day'' after a father
pays.
Council's investigation also answered the question Ann Negoescu of Nazareth asked in March
2016 about how much interest the domestic relations office earned when it held her support for 4
to 6 weeks: None. Support money is held in a non-interest-bearing checking account. If anyone
benefited from the ''float'' of hundreds of thousands of dollars in the account, it was Lafayette
Trust Bank which, council was told, had ''overnight'' use of the money.
Date: TUESDAY, May 8, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: THIRD
COUNTY'S THEFT PROBE NEARS END
REPORT DUE IN 4-6 MONTHS
The Morning Call
A Northampton County Council committee investigating embezzlements and mismanagement in
the county domestic relations office will hold one more public hearing and then issue its final
report within the next four to six months.
Councilman Richard T. Grucela, who chairs the special committee, said the committee will hear
testimony from representatives of the state auditor general's office within a month and will issue
a final report after that. The date of the hearing will depend on when the auditor general's report
is released.
Since September, there have been eight council manic hearings at which 16 witnesses testified
about the operation of the office. The last hearing was in December.
Grucela said the auditor general's staff has completed its work and will be giving a report of its
findings to Dist. Atty. Donald B. Corriere. Those findings will reportedly be released to council
and the public after the sentencing of Renee L. Godshalk, a domestic relations computer operator
who pleaded guilty to taking child support payments.
According to testimony, there may be $114,000 missing from the domestic relations office due to
embezzlement or mismanagement. Godshalk was arrested for taking $9,450 and pleaded guilty
to embezzling more than $84,000. She later said she took substantially less than $84,000 but was
told to take the blame for the larger amount by Domestic Relations Director William N. Davison,
who said the county could get reimbursed for the missing money and avoid adverse publicity.
The district attorney asked the auditor general to independently determine how much money
Godshalk took and how much is missing and why it is missing.
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Council's investigative committee-of-the-whole previously released an interim report in which it
made recommendations about how to correct problems in the domestic relations office.
In addition to the district attorney, the auditor general and council, the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service has entered the case and audits are being conducted by the county controller and the
private accounting firm of Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co.
Date: TUESDAY, July 17, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: FIFTH <
EMBEZZLEMENT AUDIT FINISHED
STATE'S FINDINGS BACK NORTHAMPTON
COUNTY
by TOM MOYLAN, The Morning Call
A lone computer operator in the Northampton County domestic
relations office took from $39,825 to $87,259, State Auditor
Gen. Al Benedict said yesterday at a press conference in the
courthouse.
But while that determination appears to lay to rest the question
of how much money computer operator Renee L. Godshalk
took from May 2014 to March 2016, Benedict's audit of the
domestic relations office produced some findings and
recommendations that will remain debated issues and perhaps
unsolved mysteries.
The 33-page audit reported that:
- Another $18,112 is missing from a domestic relations
checking account due to duplicate checks, bad checks,
undocumented clerical errors, computer errors, outstanding
checks or employee theft.
- There isn't enough proof to justify $59,400 that was paid by
domestic relations to a computer consultant and recommended
that the county give the state back $41,500 which it got as
partial reimbursement for the computer bill.
- The domestic relations office lacked effective financial
management, although some changes are being implemented.
- Domestic relations management was not knowledgeable about
its computer system.
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The determination of how much money was taken by Godshalk
was hailed by court and domestic relations officials as a
''vindication'' of embattled Domestic Relations Director William
N. Davison. The $87,259 that may be attributed to Godshalk is
close to the $84,000 figure that Davison helped produce before
Godshalk claimed that she was talked into taking the blame for
the missing money to make the courts look good.
But Dist. Atty. Donald B. Corriere said only the theft aspect of
the Godshalk case has been cleared up. He said he will now
look into an alleged cover-up of information uncovered during
the court's internal investigation of the matter and measures to
prevent future embezzlements.
The state auditors, who have been working on the case since
last fall, said that $39,825 of missing funds can be ''directly
attributable'' to Godshalk and that another $47,434 ''may be
attributable'' to the 23-year-old woman. The first figure was
likened to ''direct evidence'' and the second was compared to
''circumstantial evidence.''
''We feel very strongly that we could support the (district
attorney) to a point where we can get a verdict on that,'' Ben
edict said.
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Date: THURSDAY, July 19, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: THIRD <
AUDIT PROVES THAT COMPUTER OPERATOR
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MISSING FUNDS
by TOM MOYLAN, The Morning Call
Renee L. Godshalk, computer operator in the Northampton County domestic relations
office, pleaded guilty last year to embezzling more than $84,000, but later said she took
substantially less. The auditor general was called in to determine exactly how much she
was responsible for.
Officials indicated yesterday that the county's bonding company may reimburse it for all
money that it can prove was stolen, whether or not it can be attributed to anyone.
Davison said Auditor Benedict's conclusion about Godshalk ''clearly is a vindication of
what we have been saying all along.'' He said much of the auditor general's information
about thefts coincided with lists Godshalk prepared while working with Davison in his
internal investigation.
Of some of the other missing money, Benedict said, ''We really don't know and probably
never will know where some of this money went.''
Benedict said his staff could not document that Schuylkill Computer Services of
Schuylkill County provided services to justify a $59,400 payment it got in June of 2016.
Benedict said SCS president Nicholas D'Alio could produce only interim reports about
what his employees did. He said a former SCS employee said that he never completed
any computer programs for domestic relations before he was told to perform work for
another SCS client.
''The only thing they did for that money that we can see,'' Benedict said, ''is that they
found $2,100 worth of (duplicate checks).''
D'Alio could not be reached yesterday for comment, but Court Administrator Al V.
Marhefka said the auditors had access to five months worth of meeting notes
documenting what SCS did for its money.
Doberstein said he was aware of the memos but said that after ''exhaustive'' checking
was unable to document the work.
The state auditors said a contributing factor to the theft and other losses was less
attention paid to accounting controls and simple segregation of duties and an ''overreliance'' on the office's computer. One employee could accept payments, record them,
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post them to computer records and prepare bank deposits. Money could thus be easily
taken from the cash drawer and not missed because a dishonest employee could
cover his or her theft.
The auditor general said his staff discovered last month that two-year-old computer
programs which allow the unauthorized printing of checks still existed. He said the
programs were still operational.
Benedict and his aides repeatedly said, however, that despite lax conditions like
unlocked safes, they had no indications that any other employees took money.
Benedict also said his staff was ''somewhat dismayed'' that domestic relations installed a
bulletproof ''cash room'' like the kind found at banks when ''armed robbery was not a
major concern.''
Benedict did not say how much his 10-month audit cost, saying ''we don't deal in cost
accounting.'' He at one point said his was ''an expensive service,'' but said the cost was a
''very small percentage'' of the half million cost cited for the county by the private
accounting firm of Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co.

Date: FRIDAY, August 10, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: FOURTH <
CORRIERE CITES COURT COVERUP
YEARS OF NEGLIGENCE WERE HIDDEN, HE SAYS
by TOM MOYLAN, The Morning Call.
The Northampton County district attorney has concluded that
''virtually all details'' of the embezzlement and mismanagement in
the county domestic relations office ''were deliberately and
surreptitiously concealed from the district attorney, the council,
the controller and the public until after the district attorney and
the council exerted public pressure on the domestic relations
section and began probing.''
Testifying at the ninth and perhaps last public hearing of a county
council investigative committee on the subject, Dist. Atty.
Donald B. Corriere told council yesterday that while there was
no cover-up of criminal activity, there was a cover-up of ''14
years worth of incompetence, mismanagement, gross negligence
and missing money.
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County Council President Gerald E. Seyfried said he thought
that Domestic Relations Director William N. Davison had
admitted to a court-ordered cover-up ''early on'' in the county's
yearlong investigation. He quoted from Davison's sworn
testimony, in which he said the court wanted to keep from
Corriere information about the extent of the embezzlement for
fear of him turning it into a political football.
Corriere yesterday told Seyfried, ''There's been a dispute to
some degree on whether there was a cover-up . . . I think we've
tried to document it.''
To support his contentions, Corriere gave council an 11-page,
double- spaced final report that read like a legal brief, complete
with parenthetical references to other testimony, audit reports
and even news articles. Attached to the memo were 11
''exhibits,'' including previously undisclosed minutes of domestic
relations meetings.
Minutes from an Oct. 13, 2015 session said, ''WND (William
N. Davison) again emphasized that no one discusses this matter
with anyone else.'' The same minutes said that Davison told four
domestic relations employees that ''under no circumstances is
anyone to have any conversation of this problem (a $5,000-plus
checking account overdraft) with the press.''
No problems became public until March 17, 2016, when
domestic relations computer operator Renee L. Godshalk was
arrested for embezzlement. Other problems didn't surface until
August and September of last year.
The minutes of an Oct. 26, 2015 meeting said six employees
were told by former Domestic Relations Director Joseph V.
Hollshwander to ''keep quiet'' and ''don't discuss the matter with
anyone, including spouses, parents, etc.''
The minutes continue: ''JVH (Hollshwander) state that this is the
last time the issue is spoken of.''
Corriere said that Godshalk's accusation last year that Davison
told her to admit to taking more money than she did ''is still one
of Miss Godshalk's word against Mr. Davison's - no third
parties were present at crucial times.''
The district attorney said that since Godshalk admitted lying to
investigators at the time of her arrest, ''proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt based on her testimony alone would be
impossible.''
Corriere's memo concluded by asking: ''Who will be watching?''
He noted that ''no one'' watched the domestic relations office for
14 years. He said the state auditor general watched the office
while it was conducting an audit, but added ''they are no longer
there.''
Corriere said that over and above the $87,000 that Godshalk
probably took, the domestic relations office is missing another
$115,000 through lost interest, $15,000 of funds that are
missing but not attributable to anyone, and $40,000 that the
county might have to pay back to the state welfare department
for a suspect bill.
''Another question must be asked in addition to 'who will be
watching,' '' Corriere said, ''and that is 'which is worse, the
embezzlement of a 23- year-old thief which should be
recovered through the (bonding company) or the outright loss of
up to $115,000 due to negligence, mismanagement and lack of
accountability?' ''
During yesterday's hearing, Seyfried noted that council is
looking into the hiring of additional domestic relations staff and
what to do about the office's maligned computer system.
Corriere told council that there was no other proof that any
other domestic relations employees, present or former, were
criminally responsible for taking or mishandling money in the
office.
Many questions concerned the domestic relations computer.
Ted Doberstein of the auditor general's office testified that there
was an over-reliance on the computer and no personnel trained
to work it. He said that because the computer language was an
''obscure'' one, the office could use only one computer
consultant to keep it running.
''I think the county, in essence, has been held hostage because
of the lack of expertise about the computers,'' Doberstein said.
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Date: SATURDAY, April 8, 2015
Page: B09
Edition: SECOND
SAY BAIL SET AT $150,000 IN PHILLIPSBURG SLAYING
By JOE NIXON, The Morning Call
Bail was set at $150,000 yesterday for a Phillipsburg man
accused of shooting his wife in the back of the head in late
February in their home. Warren County Prosecutor Richard C. Hare asked Warren
County Superior Court Judge John Kingfield to set bail at $150,000, while Miller'
attorney, Elizabeth Smith, suggested $25,000. Smith stated that Miller was not a flight
risk and would be unable to make bail for a greater amount. Miller was remanded to
Warren County Jail in lieu of bail.
Daniel N. Miller Jr., 26, of 259 Chambers St., was charged by
Phillipsburg police Thursday night with the first-degree murder
of his wife, Lisa Caren Miller, 27. She was found dead Feb. 26, 2015 in the doorway of
the couple’s bedroom.
Hare told Kingfield a review of the medical, forensic and
ballistic evidence indicated the death was homicide. He said
suicide was a ''physical and medical impossibility,'' and that Miller
intended to deceive authorities into believing the death was a
suicide. Hare added that the location of the body in the doorway of the couple’s
bedroom indicates that Mrs. Miller was attempting to exit the bedroom when she was
shot.
According to Phillipsburg Patrolman Thomas Walsh, Miller told police that he had just
returned home visiting a friend and was fixing something to eat when his wife came
downstairs with the weapon and threatened to shoot herself with it. He told the victim to
go back upstairs and put the weapon away. Approximately two minutes later, he went
upstairs, opened the door, and saw the victim pull the trigger. Miller later changed his
story stating that the gun went off when he tried to take it from his wife.
Friends of the victim, Lisa, and Daniel Miller recalled that the couple “frequently
argued” and that these arguments often started after “Dan had been drinking.” Hare said
that Daniel Miller was drinking alcohol on the night of Lisa’ death. A co-worker of
Daniel Miller, who was questioned by police as to Miller’ nature, said that Miller had a
bad temper and was often complaining about his wife. Chris Jensen of Hope, who
hunted with Miller, stated that “Dan only married Lisa so that he could have children”
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and when Lisa seemed to be choosing a career over his plans for a family he got angry.
“He just about shot everything in sight when he started talking about her.”
Russell stated that Lisa had told family members that the couple often fought about
money and the amount of time that Dan spent on the shooting range.
Miller denies both the prosecutor’s and the family’s assertions. He stated that the
couple did not frequently fight about money or the amount of time that he spent on the
shooting range.

Date: SATURDAY, April 12, 2015
Page: B09
Edition: SECOND
DEFENDAN IN PHILLIPSBURG SLAYING RELEASED FROM JAIL
by JOE NIXON, The Morning Call
Daniel Miller, the Phillipsburg man accused of shooting his wife in the back of the head
in late February in their home, was released from jail today on a $150,000 property
bond.
Miller, a tall man with blond hair and a blond mustache, an electrician and a 1980
graduate of Hunterdon Central High School, calmly told Judge Kingfield he understood
the charges against him and understood his rights. His father, Daniel Miller Sr., of
Whitehouse Station, Hunterdon County, was in the courtroom yesterday. Defense
attorney Elizabeth Smith told the court the elder Miller would put his home up, along
with his son's, in order to make bail. Warren County Superior Court Judge John
Kingfield agreed to release the defendant on a $150,000 property bond.
Daniel N. Miller Jr., 26, of 259 Chambers St., was charged by
Phillipsburg police Thursday night with the first-degree murder
of his wife, Lisa Caren Miller, 27. She was found dead Feb. 26 in the doorway of the
couples bedroom.
Warren County prosecutor Richard C. Hare told Judge Kingfield a review of the
medical, forensic and ballistic evidence indicated the death was homicide. He said
suicide was a ''physical and medical impossibility,'' and that Miller intended to deceive
authorities into believing the death was a suicide. Hare added that the location of the
body in the doorway of the couple’s bedroom indicates that Mrs. Miller was attempting
to exit the bedroom when she was shot.
The prosecutor said some aspects of the case, starting with the
initial investigation, ''gave us some cause for concern.'' He said
the death was suspicious from the start.
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According to Hare, Miller is considered “hot-tempered”
by friends, and has a history of turbulent relationships with women. Hare said that the
women whom he spoken with, who had been in a relationship with Miller at one time,
claimed that Dan would often become “threatening” and “abusive” during even the
“smallest of arguments.” Hare said that one of these women found it necessary to obtain
a restraining order against Miller.
After a year of therapy Dan Miller had presumably learned to control his temper and had
made a “fresh start” when he married Lisa, though the couple still went through some
rough patches. It can plainly be seen that Dan’s past history will leave a challenge for
Defense attorneys to surmount.
Date: FRIDAY, April 21, 2015
Page: B03
Edition: THIRD
P’BURG MAN FACES TRIAL IN WIFE’S DEATH
by JOE NIXON, The Morning Call
The Warren County grand jury yesterday returned a three-count
indictment against Daniel N. Miller Jr. of Phillipsburg, charging
him with the first-degree murder of his wife Lisa in late February.
Phillipsburg police charged Miller, 26, on April 6th with shooting his wife in the back
of the head Feb. 26 with a 9 MM Beretta handgun in the couple's home. In addition to
first-degree murder, Miller was indicted on charges of possession of a weapon for
unlawful acts and for resisting arrest. According to Phillipsburg Patrolman Thomas
Walsh, at the time of his arrest Miller did not cooperate with police, causing police to
use force in order to take him into custody.
Miller stated that at the time of the arrest he was upset and he could not believe that the
police were arresting him for the murder of his wife. Miller stated that “I loved Lisa and
would never do any-thing to hurt her.” He stated that the thought of being arrested for
her murder caused him to “snap and lash out against the officers.”
Miller, of the 200 block of Chambers Street, is scheduled to enter a plea to the
indictments at 9 a.m. May 5 at the Warren County Courthouse. His attorney, Elizabeth
Smith of the Public Defender’s office, said yesterday her client will plead innocent to
the charges and is looking forward to presenting his side of the case at trial.
Warren County Prosecutor Richard C. Hare told County Superior Court Judge John
Kingfield at the bail hearing that, based on the evidence in the case, suicide was a
''physical and medical impossibility.'' He said Lisa Miller was shot from a distance
because the wound was not a contact or close-contact wound. Lisa Miller was found in
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the doorway of the couple's bedroom. The gun, which was legally owned by the
defendant, was recovered at the scene.
The prosecutor's office has not said whether it will seek the
death penalty in the case. A conviction on first-degree murder
carries a minimum sentence of 30 years in prison without parole.
Daniel and Lisa Miller had been married for about five years and
had moved to Phillipsburg about two and a half years ago from
Hunterdon County. Friends of the victim, Lisa, and Daniel Miller recalled that the
couple frequently argued” and that these arguments often started after “Dan had been
drinking.” Hare said that Daniel Miller had been drinking alcohol on the night of Lisa’
death.
Elsa Gasiorowski, Lisa mother, and Laura Gasiorowski, her
sister, stated that Mrs. Miller was shopping for new clothes for
her new job on the day of her death. They said she was very
happy because of her promotion and was looking forward to
working in her new job.
Laura Gasiorowski said that her sister loved her job at Somerset
Trust Company, but Dan did not. Laura stated that her sister was
overjoyed about the promotion, but when she called Dan to tell
him the news he was angry and began to yell at her over the phone. He told her not to
take the promotion, because it meant more hours and more time away from home. Lisa
told her sister after she got off the phone that she didn’t care and she wouldn’t let Dan
spoil her good mood; she was going to take the job anyway.
Date: Saturday, February 2, 2017
Page: B14
Edition: SECOND
MILLER WILL AWAIT TRIAL AT
HOME IN NEW MEXICO
The Morning Call
Phillipsburg resident Daniel Miller Jr. was granted permission
yesterday to move to New Mexico while awaiting a murder
trial.
Miller, 28, of Chambers Street remains free on $150,000
property bond while awaiting the start of a trial scheduled for
October.
Miller is accused of shooting his first wife Lisa, in the head in February, 2015. Miller contends
that Lisa was attempting to commit suicide and the pistol fired when he tried to pull it away.
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New Jersey Superior Court Judge John Kingfield granted Miller
permission to join his wife and daughter in New Mexico. Miller remarried 10 months after the
death of his first wife Lisa and the couple now has one child. Bail will remain at $150,000.
“The move is permanent inasmuch as Mr. Miller intends to
reside there between now and the trial," Miller' attorney, Elizabeth Smith noted.
Assistant Warren County Prosecutor Robert Russell felt the move across the country might
jeopardize the trial date, which "absolutely cannot be changed."
Judge Kingfield said permission to move to New Mexico was
granted on the following conditions:
*Miller is to remain in contact with the bail unit of the probation
department in a method to be determined by the unit.
*Miller is to remain at the address which he will give to the court
and cannot move without permission from the court.
*Miller must be available to his defense attorney at any time to
prepare for the case.
*Miller must be present at all pretrial hearings when requested by
the court.
"The trial will not be adjourned in the future because the
defendant is unavailable to counsel," the judge warned.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Date: Saturday, September 7, 2017
Edition: SECOND
Section: LOCAL/REGION
PARENTS GRIEVE THE LOSS OF THEIR DAUGHTER
AND LAY BLAME ON THEIR EX SON-IN-LAW
"My never-ending nightmare began on Feb. 26, 2015, at 11 p.m. when a police officer
came to my front door and told us my daughter was dead – shot in the head. This neverending pain of not seeing her smile or hearing her voice has devastated me."
These are the words of Elsa Gasiorowski, the mother of Lisa Miller. As time brings us
closer to the trial for Daniel Miller Jr., we decided to talk to Lisa’s family, Elsa, Laura,
and Chester Gasiorowski, to see how they are coping with their loss and preparing for the
trial ahead.
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Dan is accused of shooting his wife, Lisa Gasiorowski Miller, in the head on the night of
Feb 26, 2015. Although Dan Miller has pled not guilty, Lisa’s parents have no doubt that
he is the cause of their daughter’s death.
To Miller, Mrs. Gasiorowski asks, "Why did you kill my daughter? You are a murderer.
Our beloved Lisa has been taken away from us. Why did you do it? Why did you take
her away from us?"
Taken at the prime of her life, Lisa Miller was only 27 years old at the time of her
gruesome death. She had just received a promotion at the Somerset Trust Company,
where she worked. Lisa and her sister had gone shopping on the morning of her death for
some “corporate” looking clothes. Laura, Lisa’s sister, said that Dan had not wanted Lisa
to take the promotion to supervisor. Laura said that the couple had often argued about
having children.
“He wanted her to quit her job and start a family,” Laura said, when asked about Dan
and Lisa’s relationship. “Lisa wanted it all though—a career, family, and loving husband.
He just didn’t want the same things for her and did his best to prevent her from following
her dreams.”
"Dan Miller Jr. has never shown any emotion about [Lisa’s] death -- no remorse.” Lisa’s
mother says. “ He never said he was sorry that Lisa was dead. They were married about
six years, yet he remarried just 10 months after her death. Not once has he said a good
word about my daughter. He sits there stone-faced, self-righteous. Dan is a murderer and
should pay for his crime by being in jail for as long as possible without parole."
“Yeah, I guess he finally got the family he wanted,” Laura added, “Only 10 months after
Lisa died Dan remarried and now has a child with his new wife. It’s just not fair how he
can act like nothing happened, like he doesn’t care that my sister lost her future and her
life, while he just goes off and starts a new one with this woman. I don’t see how
anyone could marry him knowing the allegations against him right now, regardless of the
fact that he hasn’t been in court yet. Especially now that his abusive past has been
exposed.”
Indeed, many have been talking about Dan’s past relationships. According to Assistant
Warren County Prosecutor Robert Russell, Miller was considered “hot-tempered” by
friends and has a history of turbulent relationships with girlfriends.
“Dan has had a long line of turbulent relationships with women, including one who
received a restraining order against him, though she does not wished to be quoted,” said
Russell. “She did, however, claim that Dan would often become ‘threatening and abusive
during even the smallest of arguments.’”
Presumably, after a year of therapy Miller had learned to control his temper and had
made a “fresh start” when he married Lisa, though the couple still went through some
rough patches.
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When we went to interview Chester Gasiorowski, Lisa's father, he was too upset to speak
with us. Instead, he asked us to include a statement he had written. In his letter he stated,
"Lisa's dead, and no one can change that. We are tormented by her loss. Dan Miller Jr. is
a coward. He knows exactly what he did. He cost the state of New Jersey over $1 million
to investigate this crime. He shows no emotion. He feels if he keeps quiet and has a good
lawyer, he will get off lightly. He will never be found innocent, it’s just not possible. The
only question is the degree of his guilt."
Gasiorowski, suffering from cancer, said his daughter was his
strength in his fight against the disease. He said Lisa had helped him paint his house and
that he and his daughter were extremely close. Gasiorowski noted that he helped Miller
when he needed a job, and Lisa supported him through electricians school.

Date: Monday, October 7, 2017
Page: B03
Edition: THIRD
MILLER DIDN'T KILL HERSELF, PARENTS SAY

The Morning Call
Lisa Miller did not like guns and was unlikely to have shot herself
to death, her parents say in reaction to Daniel Miller’ claim that she committed suicide on
Feb. 26, 2015.
Since he was charged with the murder of his wife on April 6, Daniel Miller has
maintained Mrs. Miller shot herself as he tried to take a revolver from her.
Chester Gasiorowski, Mrs. Miller' father, told reporters he had tried to teach his daughter
how to fire a pistol in 1984. "She didn't like it. She fired two rounds and never fired
again. Lisa never had a weapon at any time."
In a video statement made to Phillipsburg police in 2015, Miller
said his wife was threatening to shoot herself in the head after an
argument and that he tried to take the revolver out of her left
hand when it accidentally fired.
Gasiorowski says that his daughter was right-handed. He says she
had not been hampered in using her right hand after elbow
surgery, contrary to what Miller has stated in previous interviews with police.
Gasiorowski adds that his daughter helped him paint his house. "After she had the
operation on her right elbow, she lifted heavy paint buckets, moved the ladder for me,
and held a paintbrush with her right hand," he said.
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Lisa’s family also rejects the idea that she would have killed herself. Lisa was excited
about a new job and was looking forward being a supervisor, reports her sister, Laura
Gasiorowski. On the day of her death and in preparation for her new job Lisa went
shopping for new clothes. Dan Miller, however, was upset about the promotion because
he believed that “Lisa would not have time to take care of a family,” reports Lisa’s sister,
Laura Gasiorowski. Laura stated that Dan did not want Lisa to take the promotion. He
wanted to start a family. Laura stated that Lisa wanted a career, family and loving
husband, but unfortunately, Dan did not want the same things for her.

Date: Friday, October 11, 2017
Page: B01
Edition: THIRD
DID MILLER KILL HIS WIFE,
OR DID SHE KILL HERSELF?
by DENNIS KELLY, The Morning Call
"This defendant is guilty of murder," Chief Assistant
Prosecutor Robert Russell told reporters.
Miller said he walked into the bedroom of their residence of Chambers Street and found
his wife pointing a 9 MM Beretta at the left side of her head. He said the gun went off
when he tried to stop what he thought was an attempted suicide.
From a videotaped statement to Phillipsburg Police made by Miller on the night of his
wife’s death, Miller was quoted as saying, "She's cold. She's jealous. She's got a bad
temper. She's in one of her pissy, angry moods."
"Even if you didn't like the person, wouldn't you say something
nice? Wouldn't you think something nice?" Russell said. "The
anger of the guy just knocks you over when he talks about his
dead wife."
Russell questioned why Miller, who he said knew cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR), did not administer it to his wife. "He didn't even wipe the blood away
from her face."
Russell said Mrs. Miller was a young woman with a future who
had just received a promotion at work and was shopping for clothing the day of her death,
because she wanted a "corporate look."
Lisa Miller had a strong family background, visiting her family's house three to five times
a week while married to Miller. According to Lisa’s sister, Laura Gasiorowski , Dan
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Miller was jealous of the amount of time Lisa spent with her family and resented her
working. He felt that “she should devote her time to their family and to having children.”
"Lisa would have left a note," Laura Gasiorowski added. "It makes no sense that Lisa was
going to kill herself. She wouldn’t do that to us, her family."
Russell said the state had enough evidence to show that "this
man picked up the gun and fired it into her head."
Lisa’s family believes that she would never have killed herself when she had so much to
look forward to.
______________________________________________________________________________
Date: Monday, October 14, 2017
Page: B03
Edition: THIRD
JUDGE WON'T DISMISS MILLER CASE
DEFENDAN’S ‘STORIES’ DIFFERED, HE SAYS
by DENNIS KELLY, The Morning Call
There are many unanswered questions as proceedings are set to begin in the trial of
Daniel Miller Jr., accused of shooting his wife in the head in 2015 in the couple's
Phillipsburg home.
Defense Attorney Elizabeth Smith is preparing several character
witnesses to testify to Miller' "honesty and trustworthiness," and prosecuting attorney
Robert Russell is preparing to de-bunk each of them.
In a pre-trial motion yesterday, Smith asked for dismissal of the murder indictment. "I
know it's a motion that's made as a matter of course," she says, but she feels that the
state “can not prove there was purposeful murder or knowing murder."
"There were only four bullets in the gun," Smith said. "If there
were six I could see how the jury could conclude it was
purposeful."
Phillipsburg Detective John Flynn stated that Miller told him
he kept two of the six chambers empty so that if his wife tried to
shoot herself, she would have to pull the trigger more than once.
Russell, when confronted with this statement from the defense, refuted it. "This is a cold,
calculated murder. When he aimed the gun at her head he knew he was going to kill her.
This was not a self-inflicted wound. The only person there was the defendant. What's
important is the defendant puts himself there."
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He added that “though four bullets were found in the gun, two others were found in the
room. Indeed it is suspicious for the other two bullets to be found in the room. If only
four were left in the gun, why bother with the other two in the room? Also, if Miller
knew his wife to be so emotional as to consider suicide, why keep a loaded weapon in
the house at all? There are just too many questions.”
Warren County Superior Court Judge John Kingfield denied the defense's dismissal
motion. "There is evidence to support the claim of knowing or purposeful murder. The
defendant told several stories to the police," Kingfield said, referring to a Phillipsburg
police report that in Miller' initial call he said his wife shot herself and then later told
police the gun went off when he tried to grab it.
"The jury could conclude the defendant was not telling the truth,"
Kingfield said. "If the jury chooses not to believe the defendant,
they could also choose not to believe there was an empty
chamber."
Trial proceedings are set to begin next week in the Phillipsburg County courthouse.
Date: Friday, October 18, 2017
Page: B03
Edition: THIRD
JURY SEATED IN MILLER MURDER TRIAL
WIFE-SLAYING CASE TO OPEN OCT. 21
by DENNIS KELLY, The Morning Call
Jury selection is complete and pre-trial motions began yesterday
in the trial of a Phillipsburg man accused of fatally shooting his
wife in the head.
The trial of Daniel N. Miller, 28, for first-degree murder of Lisa Miller on Feb. 26, 2015,
gets under way. He is accused of shooting her with a 9 MM Beretta.
The jury selection process began Monday and ended yesterday
after 16 people were chosen. "It went quicker than I thought,"
Assistant Prosecutor Robert Russell said of the jury selection.
Afterward, Superior Court Judge John F. Kingfield heard the
pretrial motions of both attorneys.
Russell said Miller' attorney wanted to exclude the testimony of a psychiatrist, who
would have disputed the defense's claim that Miller' wife was suicidal. The psychiatrist
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will testify that Lisa was not suicidal prior to her death, that she had strong family
support and her career was taking off.
In his defense, Miller said the shooting was accidental and that he was trying to stop a
suicide attempt by his wife when the gun went off.
Russell said the defense also wanted to eliminate the testimony
of a New Mexico witness "who was going to testify about
something Miller said." Sources have it that Miller made statements to his New Mexico
neighbor that his first wife was “spoiled” and “only thought of herself, refusing to start a
family so she could have her career.” The neighbor is reported as saying that Dan
now has the family life he always wanted, something his former wife would not give
him.
Earlier this year, Judge Kingfield allowed Miller to live in New Mexico with his second
wife and their child to await a trial date after Miller posted $150,000 in bail, but Russell
said Miller has been living in New Jersey for the past few months. Miller and his first
wife lived on Chambers Street at the time of the shooting.
Miller also faces charges of possessing a gun for an unlawful purpose and hindering
apprehension or prosecution.
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APPENDIX J: RECALL TEST-PTP ABSENT
Article 1
1. What was Ann, the women who came in to the county domestic relations office, upset
about?
a. Child support checks coming in late
Article 2
2. How often were the cash register tapes checked?
a. Rarely/never
Article 3
3. How is the domestic relations office going to prevent something like this from happening
again?
a. Computer flaw corrected, check payments each day, checking account reconciled
twice a month, not same person accepting payments/duties separated
Article 4
4. When are support checks now given to mothers?
a. Day after
Article 5
5. What type of investigative actions are taking place within the domestic relations office as
a result of this theft?
a. Council hearings, audits
Article 6
6. What was one of the conclusions of the audit report?
a. Between about 40-90K was stolen
b. County should give back some $ initially paid to a computer consultant
c. DR office lacked effective management
d. DR management didn’t know enough about its computer system
Article 7
7. Is there any proof that other employees take money?
a. No
Article 8
8. What did the district attorney conclude about the domestic relations office’s role in all of
this?
a. Cover-up/employees told to keep quiet/incompetence/mismanagement, etc.
9. Did Goldshalk lie to police in the preliminary investigation?
a. Yes
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APPENDIX K: RECALL TEST-PTP PRESENT
Article 1:
1. In what city did this occur?
a. Phillipsburg
Article 2:
2. Where in her home was Lise Bias killed?
a. Bedroom
Article 3:
3. Will the prosecution seek the death penalty?
a. No
Article 4:
4. Why did Daniel move to New Mexico after Lise’s death?
a. To join his new wife and daughter
Article 5:
5. How has Daniel Miller behaved since Lisa’s death?
a. No emotion, remarried, etc
Article 6:
6. Did Daniel Miller go to therapy?
a. Yes
Article 7:
7. How often did Lisa Miller visit her family?
a. 3-5x per week/a lot.
Article 8:
8. Why does the defense want someone to testify on Daniel Bias’s behalf?
a. To say good things about him/that he’s honest and trustworthy
Article 9:
9. Who does the prosecution hope will testify a trial to refute claim that Lise was suicidal?
a. A psychiatrist
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APPENDIX L: INSTRUCTIONS/SCRIPT FOR THE JUDGE

[In all conditions read:]
Hello everyone. I am going to question each of you about your ability to serve as mock jurors in
a murder case. The murder case is about a man, Daniel Miller, who has been accused of
murdering his wife, Lisa Miller. I am now going to ask each of you some information about
yourselves

[Look at confederate #1]
Juror number 1,
1. What county do you live in?
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Are you employed?
a. If yes – what do you do for work?
4. Do you know anyone in law enforcement?
5. Have you previously served on a jury?
Thank you.

Look at confederate #2]
Juror number 2,
1. What county do you live in?
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Are you employed?
a. If yes – what do you do for work?
4. Do you know anyone in law enforcement?
5. Have you previously served on a jury?
Thank you.

[Look at the participant]
Juror number 3,
1. What county do you live in?
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Are you employed?
a. If yes – what do you do for work?
4. Do you know anyone in law enforcement?
5. Have you previously served on a jury?
Thank you.
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The case we have before us today has received a lot of media attention. It is possible that the
media has released information about this case, none of which you should consider if you are
asked to render a verdict about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of this crime.
[Both reflection conditions:]
It is up to you to determine your suitability to serve as a juror on this case. The court cannot
make that decision for you. I understand that it may be difficult to evaluate your suitability to
serve, so I would like to try to help you by going through a brief exercise. We are asking you to
do this exercise because of how important it is that you accurately report on your ability to serve.
Information learned outside the coutroom cannot be verified. Although that information may be
compelling and seem relevant to the trial, it may have caused you to form some opinions about
the defendant, either positively or negatively. Therefore, to ensure that the defendant receives a
fair trial, you should ask yourself whether information you have learned about the case outside of
this courtroom would make it difficult for you to be impartial.
I would like to begin by asking each of you to think about any information you may have learned
about this case from the media – that is, news articles, social media, magazines, and so forth.
[In-person sessions only:]
After you have spent a couple of minutes thinking about what you may have learned
about the case, I would like you to write down, on the sheets of paper in front of you, as
much information as you can remember about this case.
[Online sessions only:]
After you have spent a couple of minutes thinking about what you may have learned
about the case, I would like you to type up and send me a direct message in the chat
feature with as much information as you can remember about this case. Please be as
detailed as possible.
[Both reflection conditions:]
Once you have finished, I would like you to spend a couple minutes thinking about whether any
knowledge you have of this case might make it difficult for you to follow the law. In other
words, I would like you to reflect on whether you believe you would have difficulty setting aside
any information you have learned about the case from the media and focus exclusively on the
evidence presented during trial in reaching a verdict.
[Allow maximum 5 minutes for reflection.
For in person sessions with writing, once they have all finished, ask each of them
individually, starting with confederate #1, to bring up their papers to you. Wait
until each person has brought his/her paper to you before calling up the next
person.
For online sessions with writing, make sure the participant sends you a direct
message with a response.]
[Look at confederate #1]
Juror number 1, I’d now like to ask you to tell me what you may know about the case. But, so as
not to expose the other jurors to any information you may have heard, I would like to ask the
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other jurors to [in person sessions:] step out of the room [online sessions:] send the other jurors
to the waiting room while you provide me with that information. [Allow time for other jurors
to leave the room. Once they have returned, thank them and move on to next question.]
[For in person sessions: Send J2 and J3 out of mock courtroom. Then swap J1 with
J2. Then swap J3 with J2.]
[For online sessions: Send J3 into the waiting room. Chat with confederates for 1-2
minutes. At this time, create a breakout room for the naïve participant but do NOT
send them there yet. Then, send both confederates into waiting room and bring in
J3.]
[Look at J3:] I would now like to ask you to tell me what you may know about the case. Please
begin when ready.
[Allow time for the participant to respond. Pretend to take notes. Do not cut the
participant off. Allow them sufficient time. If they say they can’t remember
anything, write that down as well.]
Thank you.
Juror number 1, [Look at confederate #1]
6. [Closed ended conditions only:] Regardless of what you may know about the case,
do you think you will be able to set aside everything you have heard about the case
and only base your decision on the evidence presented in this courtroom as the law
requires?
7. [Open ended conditions only:] Please explain your beliefs about your ability to set
aside any knowledge you might have about the case and be fair and impartial as the
law requires.
Thank you.
[Look at confederate #2]
Juror number 2, [look at confederate #1]
6. [Closed ended conditions only:] Regardless of what you may know about the case,
do you think you will be able to set aside everything you have heard about the case
and only base your decision on the evidence presented in this courtroom as the law
requires?
7. [Open ended conditions only:] Please explain your beliefs about your ability to set
aside any knowledge you might have about the case and be fair and impartial as the
law requires.
Thank you.
[Look at the participant]
Juror number 3,
6. [Closed ended conditions only:] Regardless of what you may know about the case,
do you think you will be able to set aside everything you have heard about the case
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and only base your decision on the evidence presented in this courtroom as the law
requires?
7. [Open ended conditions only:] Please explain your beliefs about your ability to set
aside any knowledge you might have about the case and be fair and impartial as the
law requires.
Thank you. Each of you has been selected to serve as a juror for this case. I would like to remind
you that it is your duty to set aside any biases you may have and render a verdict based only on
the evidence that will be presented to you during trial. I am going to exit the room. Please do not
speak to one another after I exit the room. Someone will be in shortly to take each of you into a
separate room where you will watch a short video of the trial and decide on whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent of murder.
[exit room]
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APPENDIX M: INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONFEDERATES

Confederates should arrive minutes before the study start time.
Remember that in the conditions where the judge instructs you to reflect on what you may
have heard about the case + type or write, ponder for 30ish seconds before you begin
typing or writing.
Note: These responses (to the judge’s questioning) will be memorized by confederates. The
experimenter will inform participants prior to each study session what condition they are in so
they know how to respond during the mock voir dire. But you can (and SHOULD) check this
yourself on the participant schedule.
[Closed ended, Impartial conditions only/Conditions 1-2, 9-10, 17-18] Yes.
[Closed ended, Mixed conditions only/Conditions 3-4, 11-12, 19-20]:
•

Flip a coin. Have confederate call it.
•

Heads: That confederate says “yes”

•

Tails: The other confederate says “no”

[Open ended, Impartial conditions only/Conditions 5-6, 13-14, 21-22] I believe that I’d be able
to do that.
[Open ended, Mixed conditions only/Conditions 7-8, 15-16, 23-24]:
•

Flip a coin. Have confederate call it.
•

Heads: That confederate says “I believe that I’d be able to be fair and
impartial.”

•

Tails: That confederate says, “I don’t believe I’d be able to be fair and
impartial.”

For some conditions, the judge will ask you to reflect about what you know about the case.
You should spend 2-3 minutes reflecting (essentially reflect until the judge starts speaking –
easy enough.) For conditions where the judge asks you to reflect AND type or write, you
should spend 1-2 minutes reflecting, 1ish minutes “fake” typing/writing, and another 1-2
minutes reflecting.
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APPENDIX N: JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What is your individual verdict? Check one.
___Not Guilty
___Guilty
2. On a scale from 1 to 7, how likely is it that the defendant, Daniel Miller, is responsible
for the murder of Lisa Miller?
Not at all
A little
Somewhat Moderately
Pretty
Mostly
Extremely
likely
likely
likely
likely
likely
likely
likely
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

3. On a scale from 1 to 7, how blameworthy is the defendant, Daniel Miller, for the murder
of Lisa Miller?
Not at all
A little
Somewhat Moderately
Pretty
Mostly
Completely
blameworth blamewort blameworth blameworth blameworth blamewort blamewort
y
hy
y
y
y
hy
hy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Instructions: For the following 5 questions, please read the following statements and indicate
your level of agreement on a scale from 1 to 7.
4. I am confident in my ability to set aside any bias I may have in deciding this case.
Strongly
Mostly
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Mostly
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree or
agree
agree
agree
1
2
3
disagree
5
6
7
4
5. I am motivated to set aside any bias I may have in deciding this case.
Strongly
Mostly
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Mostly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree or
agree
agree
1
2
3
disagree
5
6
4

Strongly
agree
7

6. During the judge’s questioning, I felt comfortable expressing any bias I may have.
Strongly
Mostly
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Mostly
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree or
agree
agree
agree
1
2
3
disagree
5
6
7
4
7. The judge influenced my response regarding my ability to be fair and impartial.
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Strongly
disagree
1

Mostly
disagree
2

Somewhat
disagree
3

Neither
agree or
disagree
4

Somewhat
agree
5

Mostly
agree
6

Strongly
agree
7

8. The responses of at least one of the jurors influenced my response regarding my ability to
be fair and impartial.
Strongly
Mostly
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Mostly
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree or
agree
agree
agree
1
2
3
disagree
5
6
7
4

9. I am confident in my ability to be fair and impartial in deciding this case.
Strongly
Mostly
Somewhat
Neither
Somewhat
Mostly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree or
agree
agree
1
2
3
disagree
5
6
4

Strongly
agree
7

10. How much do you believe any bias you may have had would have influenced your
decision-making about the defendant’s guilt/innocence?
a. Not applicable because I have no bias
b. It would have biased me a little
c. It would have biased me somewhat
d. It would have biased me a lot
e. It would have biased my decision completely
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Demographic Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions about your demographics.
1) Your Gender:
____Female
____Male
____Non-binary/third gender
____Prefer not to say
2) Your Age: ________ (years old)
3) Your Ethnicity:
____Caucasian
____African American
____Hispanic/Latino
____American Indian/Alaska Native
4) Your Political Views:
_____ Democrat
_____ Green Party

____Asian American
____Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
____Mixed (two or more races)
____Other

_____ Republican
_____ Other

_____ Libertarian Party

5) What is your individual income level?
_____Less than $25,000
_____$25,000 to $34,999
_____$35,000 to $49,999
_____$50,000 to $74,999
_____$75,000 to $99,999
_____$100,000 to $149,999
_____$150,000 or more
6) Have you ever been the victim of a violent crime? Yes/no
_____ Yes
_____ No
7) Has someone close to you (a family member, relative, close friend, etc.) ever been convicted
of a crime?
_____ Yes
_____ No
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APPENDIX O: SOURCE MONITORING TEST WITH KEY
INSTRUCTIONS: We are not interested in whether you believe that the “facts” presented
below are true. Instead, we want to know where you were exposed to these “facts” during the
experiment. That is, did you learn about a particular “fact” during the TRIAL, when you read
the CRIME STORIES, or perhaps the “fact” was presented in BOTH the trial and the crime
stories. Another possibility is that the “fact” was not presented during either the trial or the
crime stories, but instead is a NEW “fact.” Using the scale provided below place the letter that
corresponds to where you remember learning about that particular “fact” in the column labeled
SOURCE. For example, if you believe that the “fact” was presented only at trial you would put
a “T” in the SOURCE column.
SOURCE
T = Fact was presented only in the videotaped Trial (17 items)
R = Negative Related PTP (14 items)
U = Unrelated PTP (6 items)
B = The fact was presented in both the trial and the crime stories. (0 items)
N = The fact was NOT presented during either the trial or the crime stories, it’s NEW. (11
items)
Codes for Related Negative PTP
R (c) = related conflicting – conflicts with evidence presented at trial.
R (e) = related eliminating – no mention of the PTP information during the trial.
SOURCE
1. Just prior to her death Lise Bias told her husband that she was no longer going
to have his baby.

T

2. On the day of her death Daniel and Lise had an argument about Lise taking a
promotion at work.

R (c)

3. Lise’ parents were against Lise marrying Daniel Bias and they refused to attend
their wedding.

N

4. Detective John Flynn failed to do any fingerprint testing on the gun that killed
Lise Bias.

T

5. Lise did not know how to use guns and disliked them.

R (e)

6. On the day of her death Daniel and Lise had an argument about a piece of
jewelry that Lise seen earlier that day.

T

7. Lise was Daniel Bias’ second wife.

N

8. Daniel Bias has a bad temper.

R (e)
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9. Some cash child support payments from fathers were held for days, months or
even years before they were deposited into the account.

U

10. During the last couple of nights before her death, Lise was very clingy. She
demanded that Friday and Saturday that Daniel go to bed when she went to bed.

T

11. A couple of months before her death Lise Bias pulled a gun on Daniel Bias, and
Daniel had to have the Phillipsburg police come to the house. Lise told Daniel
that she was going to shoot herself and Daniel took the gun away from her.

T

12. Daniel Bias’ mother died when Dan was only 5 years old.

N

13. Daniel Bias had his hand on his wife’s hand when the gun went off.

T

14. Daniel Bias was preparing something to eat when his wife came downstairs
with the gun threatened to kill herself.

R (c)

15. Renee Godshalk, a 23-year-old computer operator in the county domestic
relations office, was arrested for embezzling child support payments.

U

16. Daniel Bias refused to take a polygraph (lie detector) test.

N

17. Prior to the night of her death, Lise Bias was brought to Warren County
hospital after having an argument with her husband in which she had threatened
to shoot herself with her husband’s gun.

T

18. Lise Bias’ body was found in the doorway of the couple’s bedroom

R (c)

19. Dan Bias’ father was a minister and he had a great influence on Dan’ life.
20. Daniel Bias was watching TV when his wife walked downstairs and pointed the
gun at him and stated “you know you just got done watching that show and see
how easy somebody could shoot somebody. I could have just shot you and not
even thought nothing of it.”

N
T

21. One reason the shortages weren't detected sooner was that domestic relations
simply weren’t balancing its checkbook on time.

U

22. On the night of Lise’ death when Daniel first saw Lise with the gun in her hand
he believed that she was clowning around and was doing it for attention.

T

23. Daniel and Lise Bias frequently argued and that these arguments often started
after Daniel had been drinking.

R (e)

24. Lise Bias refused to let Dan’s children from his previous marriage live with
them.

N

.
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25.
26. Lise Bias was standing by the mirror when the gun went off.

T

27. Lise and Daniel Bias had just moved into their new house just weeks before
Lise’s death

N

28. Daniel Bias had been drinking alcohol on the night of his wife’s death.

R (e)

29. Lise Bias helped her father, Chester Gasiorowski, build a tool shed.

T

30. Godshalk took another $54,493 under another scheme in which she relied on a
flaw in a computer program to cover missing money.

U

31. Prior to her death Lise and Daniel Bias had been discussing divorce.

T

32. Daniel Bias knew CPR but did not administer it to his wife.

R (e)

33. Just prior to her death, Lise Bias had an argument with her parents and was not
speaking to them.

N

34. Lise Bias helped her father, Chester Gasiorowski, paint her parent’s house.

R (c)

35. Godshalk told officials she would take a cash support payment from a father,
ring it up on a cash register and give the father a receipt. She would later pocket
the cash and destroy the office receipt.

U

36. Daniel and Lise had gone through a trial separation approximately a year prior
to Lise’ death.

N

37. If Lise Bias had shot herself the entry wound’s edges would not have been
circular, but rather, they would be star-shaped.

T

38. The prosecutor questioned why there were two other bullets found in the room
R (e)
where Lise Bias died, if only four bullets were left in the gun that killed Lise
Bias? That is, though four bullets were found in the gun, two others were found
in the room where Lise Bias died.
39. Davison says support payments are now deposited daily and are not held under
any circumstances. Support checks, he says, are distributed to mothers ''within
one day'' after a father pays.

U

40. Lise Bias had been having an affair and Daniel Bias learned of this affair just
prior to Lise’ death.

N

41. Lise Bias had not been hampered in using her right hand after her elbow
surgery.

R (e)
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42. When Lise Bias can downstairs with a 357 Magnum she told her husband that,
“It’s times like this that people kill themselves.”

T

43. Daniel had wanted Lise to quit her job and start a family.

R (e)

44. The autopsy report of Dr. Isidore Mihalakis indicated that the doctor had
performed gentle rinsing on the hair that he clipped from Lise Bias’ head.

T

45. Lise Bias had earned her B.A. in social work from the State University of New
York in Cortland.

N

46. At the time of his arrest for Lise’ murder, Daniel Bias was also charged with
resisting arrest.

R (e)

47. Daniel Bias pulled the gun out from underneath the bed and shot his wife as she
was walking out the door.

T

48. Daniel Bias had been to the shooting range on the day of his wife’s death.

T

49. Daniel and Lise frequently fought about the amount of time that Daniel spent
on the shooting range.

R (e)
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APPENDIX P: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT
In this study we assessed how people’s responses during voir dire (jury selection) are
influenced by the actions of the judge and other jurors. Research indicates jurors are not
accurately responding to questions about their ability to be fair and impartial during voir dire,
which causes problems for defendant’s right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. We predict
jurors are not able to accurately self-report bias because of situational pressures. Thus, we sought
to examine whether people’s decision to say they can set aside bias resulting from exposure to
media publicity about a criminal case and be fair and impartial is influenced by the behavior of
the judge and other jurors. Does the way the judge asks the question matter? Does whether other
jurors say they can be fair and impartial or not matter?
The other individuals who participated in the mock voir dire were not actual participants.
They were confederates, or assistants of the research study. The judge is a professional actor.
This was required in order for us to understand how actual participants would naturally behave
based on the behavior of other individuals. If we can understand where these situational
pressures are coming from (the judge vs. other jurors), we can take steps to minimize these
pressures in actual cases and increase the accuracy of jurors’ responses to questioning about their
ability to be fair and impartial.
This study also sought to test a method of minimizing the biasing effects of media
exposure on jurors’ verdicts. Media exposure tends to prejudice jurors’ decisions because of
confusion between what was presented in the media and what was presented during trial. We
were interested in whether this type of error—and the biasing effects of media exposure—could
be minimized by providing jurors with time to reflect on and write down information they have
learned from the media.
If, after completing this study, you feel any anxiety or concern about the effects of any
previous life experiences that troubled you, the Division of Trauma of the American
Psychological Association may provide useful information. http://www.apatraumadivision.org/
If you have any questions regarding this project or would like to see the results, please do
not hesitate to contact either of the primary investigators at your own convenience (their contact
information is provided below). If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research
participant or any concerns regarding this project, you may report them—confidentially, if you
wish—to the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918. You may also
contact hrpp@cuny.edu.
Again, thank you very much for your participation.
all the best,
Natalie Gordon, MA
PhD Candidate, Adjunct Professor
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology

112

Margaret Kovera, PhD
Presidential Scholar and Professor
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology

524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019
Office: 10.63.23 NB
Email: nagordon@jjay.cuny.edu
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524 West 59th St
New York, NY, 10019
Ph: (212) 484-1112
Office: 10.65.02 NB
Email: mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu
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